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Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection
THE CULTURAL BIAS AGAINST
“MIND READING” DEVICES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last fifteen years, scientists have discovered a
way to watch the brain think.1 New functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) technology can take pictures of a
person’s brain at the very moment the person is engaged in a
task.2 An fMRI machine can generate images that vividly show
which brain regions are at work while, say, answering a
question or telling a story.3 Studies show that a person
answering a question truthfully uses relatively few brain
regions, typically those associated with memory.4 Telling a lie,
however, seems to require many more brain regions, including
those linked to calculation and cognitive control.5 Thus, by
showing how much brain activity is taking place and where in
the brain the activity is occurring, fMRI technology can reveal
one’s cognitive tasks.6
1
See Roberta Conlan, A Life-Saving Window on the Mind and Body: The
Development of Magnetic Resonance Imaging, in NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., BEYOND
DISCOVERY: THE PATH FROM RESEARCH TO HUMAN BENEFIT (2001),
http://www.beyonddiscovery.org/content/view.page.asp?I=135 (“The breakthrough that
led to functional MRI, fMRI as it is known, came in the early 1980s, when George
Radda and colleagues at the University of Oxford, England, found that MRI could be
used to register changes in the level of oxygen in the blood, which in turn could be used
to track physiological activity.”); Columbia fMRI, The Future Role of functional MRI in
Medical Applications, http://www.fmri.org/fmri.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (“The
recent discovery that magnetic resonance imaging can be used to map changes in brain
hemodynamics that correspond to mental operations extends traditional anatomical
imaging to include maps of human brain function. . . . This new ability to directly
observe brain function opens an array of new opportunities to advance our
understanding of brain organization . . . .”).
2
Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Seeks Information About Government Use of
Brain Scanners in Interrogations (June 28, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/privacy/medical/
26035prs20060628.html.
3
Id.; Columbia fMRI, supra note 1.
4
Steve Silberman, Don’t Even Think About Lying: How Brain Scans are
Reinventing the Science of Lie Detection, WIRED, Jan. 2006, at 142.
5
Id. See infra note 47.
6
Silberman, supra note 4, at 142.
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At the moment, two rival companies, Cephos Corp.7 and
No Lie MRI, Inc.,8 are competing for the new market in fMRI
lie-detection technology.9 They hope to assist defendants who
would voluntarily submit to the test in order to bolster claims
of innocence.10 The companies “use similar techniques, but
different software” to analyze the scans.11 They both want to be
the first to successfully use the technology at trial.12 No court
has passed judgment on the new test’s admissibility.13
However, while the science is still being tested,14 No Lie MRI
administered the first commercial use of fMRI lie detection in
December of last year.15 Cephos has not begun commercial
7
The company is headquartered in Pepperell, Massachusetts. See Cephos
Corp., Contact, http://www.cephoscorp.com/contact.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
Note that David Faigman, leading evidence scholar and author of the treatise Modern
Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony, is a legal advisor to
Cephos. See Cephos Corp., Legal Advisors, http://www.cephoscorp.com/legal.htm (last
visited May 18, 2007).
8
Headquartered in San Diego, California. Vicki Haddock, Lies Wide Open,
Researchers Say Technology Can Show When and How a Lie is Created Inside the
Brain, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 2006, at E1.
9
See Silberman, supra note 4, at 146. No Lie MRI currently claims “fifty
prospective clients.” Haddock, supra note 8, at E1 (The prospective clients include,
“wives who want to assure their husbands of their sexual fidelity, fathers fighting
accusations of child molestation in child-custody disputes, and one California
defendant the company won’t identify who faces the possibility of a death penalty
unless he can convince a jury of his innocence.”). Cephos maintains that it receives “at
least a call a week” from potential clients. Telephone Interview with Steven Laken,
Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Cephos Corp., in Pepperell, Mass. (Oct. 27,
2006) [hereinafter Laken Transcript] (transcript at 5:13; on file with author).
10
See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 4:24-5:3 (discussing Cephos’ aims);
Haddock supra note 8, at E1 (suggesting No Lie MRI’s aims). It is important to note
that voluntary submission generally renders moot various constitutional challenges the
technology may imply regarding illegal searches and self-incrimination. For a
discussion of fMRI lie detection and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, see, for
example, Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301 (2006).
11
Richard Willing, MRI Tests Offer a Look at the Brains Behind the Lies,
USA TODAY, June 27, 2006, at 5A. See No Lie MRI, http://www.noliemri.com (last
visited Mar. 30, 2007).
12
See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 6:20-7:20, 9:20-24.
13
As of March 21, 2007, Lexis and Westlaw searches of “functional magnetic
resonance imaging” and of “fMRI” reveal no state or federal case concerning lie
detection. A handful of federal cases discuss fMRI at length in reference to proving
detrimental effects of violent video games on children. E.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v.
Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005). See also Silberman, supra note 4, at
150.
14
Silberman, supra note 4, at 150.
15
Phil McKenna, Can a Brain Scan Prove You’re Telling the Truth?,
NEWSCIENTIST.COM, Feb. 10, 2007, at 13, http://www.newscientist.com/channel/opinion/
mg19325904.600-can-a-brain-scan-prove-youre-telling-the-truth.html. (A deli-owner,
being sued by his insurance company after his building was consumed in a fire, was
attempting to demonstrate that he did not set the fire.) There is no indication that an
evidentiary hearing has taken place.
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tests, insisting that further studies still need to be done to
prove to the courts the technology’s validity.16
The New York Times, in a recent article on the subject,
put forward the common wisdom: Once this technology’s proven
accuracy reaches ninety to ninety-five percent, trial courts will
admit it.17 This Note suggests that such an analysis fails to
take into account one powerful factor: society’s suspicion and
fear of “mind reading” technologies. Beyond and beneath the
established evidentiary hurdles, a cultural dislike of such
technologies will further stiffen the admissibility requirements.
United States District Judge for the Southern District of New
York Jed Rakoff spoke this year at a panel discussing fMRI lie
detectors.18 The title of his presentation betrays a lurking,
individualized skepticism perhaps shared by other members of

16
Laken released a statement on the Cephos website during the same month
as the No Lie MRI commercial launch. The statement reads in part:

Because of the power inherent in the ability to distinguish truth from
deception and because of the potential of such technologies to create changes
in social behavior, the team at CEPHOS believes that it is incumbent upon us
to be particularly thorough before releasing any products to the commercial
market. And we intend to ensure that we hold ourselves to the highest
scientific standards by conducting reproducible experiments.
We feel
strongly that any entity offering commercial services in this field should limit
their availability to those areas where peer-reviewed scientific data supports
their use.
Press Release, Cephos Corp., Cephos’ CEO speaks on Commercial Testing (Dec. 2006),
http://www.cephoscorp.com/cephos_comm_testing_20061215%20v2.pdf
[hereinafter
CEO speaks]. Laken also states, “we are focused in the near-term on the national
security marketplace, where fMRI technology has specialized applicability to unique
and critical issues within the U.S. Government.” Id. Cephos is currently doing a study
funded by the Defense Department. Michael Arndt, Scanning the Brain—For Lies,
BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 2005, at 123.
17
Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand: How Neuroscience is Transforming
the Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, (Magazine), at 53 (cover story) (“Steven
Laken, the president of Cephos, . . . says he hopes to reach the 90-percent- to 95percent-accuracy range—which should be high enough to satisfy the Supreme Court’s
standards for the admission of scientific evidence. Judy Illes, director of Neuroethics at
the Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, says, ‘I would predict that within five years,
we will have technology that is sufficiently reliable at getting at the binary question of
whether someone is lying that it may be utilized in certain legal settings.’”). See Pardo,
supra note 10, at 304-05 (stating that sufficient accuracy along with a proper
understanding of the technology will lead to admittance). For discussion of Pardo’s
analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 343-50.
18
See Corydon Ireland, Symposium: “Will Brain Imaging Be Lie Detector Test
of the Future?”, HARV. UNIV. GAZETTE, Feb. 8, 2007, available at
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2007/02.08/01-lying.html
(referencing
Judge
Rakoff’s comments from a recent symposium at the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, entitled Is There Science Underlying Truth Detection?).
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the judiciary: Can Science Detect Lies? Not in My Court.19 One
need only examine the history of polygraph evidence to see that
an important cultural prejudice against devices that betray the
brain’s private workings provides a further obstacle towards
The bold courtroom aspirations of fMRI
acceptance.20
advocates will hinge on their ability to distinguish it from the
polygraph and quell Orwellian fears, as much as it will on
proving the technology’s validity.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. that reopened the door to
polygraph admittance, even the most accurate of polygraph
techniques (which are more accurate than many forms of
admissible expert evidence)21 have been routinely rejected.
While evidentiary law, attempts to steer clear of such cultural
stigmas, the Daubert analysis, the Province of the Jury
doctrine, and Rule 403 relevance analysis all are susceptible to
such leanings. As a result, no matter how accurate the
technology becomes, nor how meticulously a party briefs the
relevant doctrines, the looming societal aversion toward “mind
reading” machines may affect the judicial ruling.22
There are a host of reasons why this technology ought to
fare better in trial courts than its oft-excluded23 predecessor,
the polygraph. (In fact, the two companies are already trying
to distinguish their analyses from the polygraph’s.24) The
polygraph measures the physiological response to deception—

19
Id. Judge Rakoff went on to critique the methodology and claimed crossexamination is still the most useful tool to detect a lie. Id.
20
Judge Rakoff compared fMRI technology to the polygraph during his
critique. Id. See infra note 291.
21
See infra text accompanying note 185.
22
This is despite the willingness of the fMRI subjects.
23
John C. Bush, Note, Warping the Rules: How Some Courts Misapply
Generic Evidentiary Rules To Exclude Polygraph Evidence, 59 VAND. L. REV. 539, 54252 (2006).
24
See Silberman, supra note 4, at 146 (Steven Laken says, “‘The biggest
challenge is that this is new to a lot of different groups of people. You have to get
lawyers and district attorneys to understand this isn’t a polygraph. I view it as no
different than developing a diagnostic test.’”). No Lie MRI’s website has an entire web
page devoted to competing technologies. No Lie MRI, Competing Technologies,
http://www.noliemri.com/products/CompetingTechnologies.htm (last visited Mar. 11,
2007). At the top of the page, the company states: “The classification of human
deception by No Lie MRI . . . software is far superior to all other methods, including
polygraphs . . . .” Id. Cephos has a web page devoted exclusively to frequently asked
questions regarding polygraphs, including a link to purchase a recent published
national study criticizing polygraph tests.
Cephos Corp., Polygraph,
http://www.cephoscorp.com/polygraph_faq.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
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the stress and nervousness that comes from lying.25 The fMRI,
however, watches the brain activity involved in executing the
cognitive task that is deception; a task that, researchers allege,
is more difficult to dissimulate.26 The assumption is that even
a trained counter-spy must use creativity and calculation to
formulate a new lie, and the most nervous Nellie will use
memory to recount an event in her past.27 Moreover, as
opposed to the squiggly-lined printouts of the polygraph, the
fMRI process can be explained using clear, high-contrast
images of the brain with the regions at work appearing in
bright colors.28 Furthermore, the fMRI appears less subject to
examiner bias because the exam questions are presented
visually on a screen and the analysis is performed using
computer software.29
Nevertheless, judges may well use the flexible
evidentiary standard that the Supreme Court laid down in
Daubert,30 designed in part to embrace newer technology,31 to
apply a stricter standard to the fMRI than it would to other
scientific evidence. Critics already argue that Daubert’s loose,
non-exclusive list of factors, upon which trial courts determine
the relevance and reliability of scientific evidence, permit

25
Charles N.W. Keckler, Cross-Examining The Brain: A Legal Analysis of
Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 543 (2006).
26
See Press Release, Radiological Soc’y of N. Am., Who’s the Liar? Brain
Stands Up to Polygraph Test (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www2.rsna.org/
pr/target.cfm?ID=273 (quoting one researcher claiming that “‘[s]ince brain activation is
arguably less susceptible to being controlled by an individual, our research will
hopefully eliminate the shortcomings of the conventional polygraph test and produce a
new method of objective lie detection that can be used reliably in a courtroom or other
setting.’”).
27
See discussion infra Part II.B.
28
Sample brain scan images can be found at the Cephos and No Lie MRI
websites. Cephos Corp., Photographs, http://www.cephoscorp.com/photos.htm (last
visited Mar. 11, 2007); No Lie MRI, Product Overview, http://www.noliemri.com/
products/Overview.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
29
See infra Part II.C.3.
30
509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993) (holding that trial judges should consider a list
of non-exclusive factors in exercising gate-keeping function).
31
See id. at 589 (contrasting Frye’s “austere standard” with the “‘liberal
thrust’” of the Federal Rules and their “‘general approach of relaxing the traditional
barriers to “opinion” testimony.’” (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153,
169 (1988))). See also United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The
Federal Rules of Evidence, although concededly more liberal than the Frye test, still
require a determination that the proffered scientific evidence is both relevant and
reliable.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony by Ethicists: What Should be the
Norm?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 198, 205 (2005).
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cultural phenomena to color the judges’ decisions.32 If this is so,
society’s incredulity and trepidation of “mind reading” devices
might further tip the evidentiary analysis towards exclusion.33
This Note examines the various evidentiary aspects of
the fMRI debate and how it diverges from the corresponding
polygraph discussion and suggests that the tendency to
associate fMRI tests with polygraphs, as well as other “mind
reading” techniques, may be a more significant liability for
fMRI admission than the law itself. Nevertheless, assuming
future tests of fMRI technology continue to demonstrate
accuracy in lie detection in both clinical trials and “real world”
conditions, the test should be allowed into the nation’s
courtrooms.34 Section II explains the fMRI technology used to
detect deception and contrasts it with the traditional polygraph
methods. Section III lays out an evidentiary analysis under
Rules 702 and 403, as well as the Province of the Jury doctrine,
demonstrating that, soon, a court may validly admit fMRI
evidence. Finally, Section IV suggests that factors beyond the
black-letter law, such as the stigma of the polygraph and the
cultural wariness of “mind reading,” may improperly influence
a court’s analysis of fMRI evidence. Thus, courts will have to
contend with two hurdles, not one—the evidentiary doctrine
and the cultural stigma. Failing to clearly parse these two
factors will (1) lead to what appears to be a suspect evidentiary
analysis and (2) leave these two companies unable to properly
prepare for the inevitable courtroom battles in the numerous
jurisdictions throughout the country.
II.

TECHNOLOGY

Because fMRI technology is so readily associated with
the polygraph, despite fundamental (and judicially relevant)
distinctions, Section II seeks to compare and contrast the two
processes. Part A will explain how fMRI technology works and
discuss its current state of development given published
32
See, e.g., A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What
Empirical Studies Tell Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 110
(2005).
33
Devin Brennan, Book Note, Carl F. Cranor’s Toxic Torts: Science, Law, and
the Possibility of Justice, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 565, 566 n.8 (2006) (Cranor “argues
that, because of prejudicial tendencies in both science and legal procedure, much of the
burden of scientific misunderstanding falls on plaintiffs in cases in which proof of
liability depends upon scientific and expert testimony.”).
34
See infra Part III.
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studies.
Part B will provide a brief description of the
polygraph.
Finally, Part C will outline the key differences
between the technologies to the extent they will affect an
evidentiary analysis: Many of the various differences between
fMRI technology and the polygraph should cause the fMRI
exam to fare better under a proper Daubert and Province of the
Jury analysis than the polygraph because the fMRI test (1)
measures that which is more closely associated with deception,
(2) promises increased accuracy, and (3) more computerized
standards than the polygraph.
A.

How fMRI Technology Works
1. Background on fMRI

A traditional magnetic resonance imaging device (MRI)
can produce a detailed image of a person’s brain.35 The subject
lies within a large machine that is composed primarily of a
magnet “50,000 times more powerful than . . . the earth’s
magnetic field.”36 This magnet aligns the orientation of the
hydrogen atoms in the brain37 each of which acts like a
miniscule compass.38 The machine then sends out a “short
pulse of radiofrequency energy” that disrupts the atoms’
orientation.39 Finally, as the atoms realign, they each “give off
small amounts of energy,” and the MRI machine can map the
locations of each energy burst. The resolution of the resulting
image “is less than 0.5 mm, about the size of the tip of a typical
ballpoint pen.”40
An fMRI machine uses the same technology to take
pictures of the brain during a specific cognitive process such as
answering a question or looking at an image.41 The pictures
35

Silberman, supra note 4, at 142.
A. Parry & P.M. Matthews, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI): A “Window” into the Brain (Ctr. for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of
the Brain, Dep’t of Clinical Neurology, Univ. of Oxford, 2002), available at
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fmri_ intro/fmri_intro.php.
37
Approximately 70% of the brain is water, which is composed of hydrogen
and oxygen. Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
fMRI research is “focused on the investigation of the neurocircuitry of the
brain that underlies cognition, perception and action.” Joy Hirsch, The Neurocircuitry
of Mind: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigations of Brain Structure
and Function (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Neurobiology and Behavior),
http://www.cumc.columbia.edu/dept/neurobeh/Hirsch_center.html (last visited Mar. 30,
36
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reveal which brain regions are involved in a particular
cognitive task by showing the newly oxygenated blood’s
location.42 The companies promoting fMRI lie detection assert
that certain regions of the brain have been associated with
various types of deception in a broad spectrum of people.43 The
underlying theory is that, when one is questioned, a normal
cognitive reaction is to formulate a truthful answer.44
Therefore, deception involves overriding, or thwarting, the
impulse and then carrying out the deception.45 Scientists
disagree to an extent on precisely which brain regions are
directly associated with lying,46 but generally agree that there
is more activity in the prefrontal lobe during a lie because this
is where cognitive reasoning takes place.47

2007). For now, lie-detection studies have reportedly focused on answering yes-or-no
questions put to the subject via computer screen. Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at
19:19-20:22. It is not clear whether a person who is carefully choosing language to
manipulate the truth will present similarly to one who is lying. Publications have not
yet addressed this issue head on. But see G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different
Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830 (2003) (finding
that memorized lies activate different regions than improvised lies but both involve
similarly heightened brain activity). The binary (yes/no) questioning may limit this
problem.
42
See Conlan, supra note 1.
43
See, e.g., Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 36:21-37:11.
44
See Silberman, supra note 4, at 144.
45
Id. at 145.
46
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 36:21-37:11. According to Laken, the
areas each group is focusing on overlap somewhat. Id.
47
Haddock, supra note 8, at E1. A recent published study conducted by
Daniel D. Langleben, the inventor of the technology used by No Lie MRI, see No Lie
MRI, About Us, http://www.noliemri.com/aboutUs/Overview.htm, concluded that
“[a]lthough lie and truth are mediated by a similar frontoparietal network, lie appears
to be a more working memory-intensive activity, characterized by increased activation
of the inferolateral cortex implicated in response selection, inhibition, and generation.”
Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth From Lie in Individual Subjects With Fast
Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262, 271 (2005). Cephos’ research has
isolated these five brain regions: “right anterior cingulate, right inferior frontal, right
orbitofrontal, right middle frontal, and left middle temporal areas.” Frank Andrew
Kozel et al., A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL
NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004) [hereinafter Kozel et al., Neural Correlates of
Deception].
Previous studies have demonstrated that the right inferior and
orbitofrontal cortex are associated with inhibiting responses and controlling emotions.
Id. Note that to the limited extent the brain activity associated with lying relates to
emotional responses, the fMRI suffers some of the same vulnerabilities as the
polygraph, namely affects from general anxiety surrounding the test, countermeasures
based on emotional control, and perhaps Province of the Jury attacks. See infra Part
III.B.2. In addition, some “regions of the cingulate gyrus have been studied for their
involvement in attention, concentration, and multitasking.” Kozel et al., Neural
Correlates of Deception, supra, at 855.
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Furthermore, because telling a lie involves more
“conscious control” than telling the truth,48 more areas of the
brain are involved.49 Cephos has focused on a set of brain
regions and divided them up into roughly 700 small threedimensional quadrants referred to as voxels.50 A voxel is
considered activated when there is newly-oxygenated blood
present in that area and it meets a minimal statistical
threshold.51 The more voxels that are activated in the larger
brain region, the more involved the cognitive activity.52
Neutral questions establish the level of voxel activation during
a truthful answer.53 This number varies from individual to
individual based on the person’s brain activation pattern.54
Additional questions establish the subject’s voxel activation
during a lie; studies show more voxel activation here.55 The
responses to the pertinent questions are then compared to
these two levels.56
One major study found that twice as many brain regions
were activated during a deceptive response.57 While seven
areas were measured as having increased use while a person
gave a truthful response, fourteen areas were at work during a
lie.58 Therefore, a jury will be able to consider not only whether
a subject used a particular brain region associated with lying
during a particular response, but the presumably more

48
F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 605 (2005) [hereinafter Kozel et
al., Detecting Deception]. Note that the theory of additional conscious effort is the same
principle offered to the court in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923),
concerning the polygraph. See infra note 82.
49
Beth W. Orenstein, Guilty? Investigating fMRI’s Future as a Lie Detector,
RADIOLOGY TODAY, May 16, 2005, at 30.
50
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 38:14-24. A voxel is approximately
three cubic millimeters.
51
See id. at 2:18-23, 38:18-20.
52
Id. at 38:14-39:4.
53
Id. at 40:10-12.
54
Id. at 39:19-40:7. Factors for this include heart rate and innate hemodynamic response. See infra Part II.B.
55
See, e.g., Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth
Telling About an Ecologically Valid Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph
Investigation--Initial Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679, 679 (2006).
56
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 43:20-25. Laken raises the importance
in maintaining transparency in the software algorithm used to interpret the voxel
count.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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apparent issue of whether the subject used significantly more
brain regions.59
Granted, even the technology’s most ardent supporters
acknowledge limitations to the fMRI’s accuracy.60 However, if
the triers of fact can learn to use this technology the way they
use other admitted scientific or forensic technologies, only
insomuch as it is pertinent in a particular case, the technology
may be helpful61 without being unduly62 prejudicial.63
2. State of the Field
The director of Neuroethics at the Stanford Center for
Biomedical Ethics asserts “that within five years, we will have
technology that is sufficiently reliable at getting at the binary
question of whether someone is lying [such] that it may be
utilized in certain legal settings.”64 Nevertheless, Cephos gets
approximately “two to three” calls per week from people who
The company, however, is not yet
want to be tested.65
sufficiently satisfied with its accuracy rate to begin operating
commercially.66 When the tests show a 90% accuracy rate in
successfully detecting deception, the company says it will open
for business.67 Steven Laken, Cephos Founder and Chief
Executive Officer, believes that a 90%-95% accuracy rate68 will

59

It is important to note that fMRI exams are only meant to detect an
intentional act to con or deceive. Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 22:25-23:1. The
subject must know that he or she is lying, or else the decision-making and response
inhibition that the test detects may not take place. Id. at 23:4-20. A person truly
convinced of a proposition, regardless of its actual truth, is not lying and will likely
appear on the brain scan to be telling the truth. Id. at 23:4-24.
Therefore, there are people with mental conditions associated with altered
conceptions of reality that may confound the test. Id. at 4:21-24. In this regard, the
fMRI and the polygraph appear similarly limited. No fMRI studies are purportedly
being done on compulsive liars, schizophrenics, or the mentally retarded. See id.
60
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 2:24-3:1.
61
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
62
See FED. R. EVID. 403.
63
See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 2:24-3:11.
64
Rosen, supra note 17, at 53.
65
Id. Harvard University Provost and Professor of Neurobiology at Harvard
Medical School Steven Hyman premised the conference on the notion that “[t]here’s an
incredible hunger to have some test that separates truth from deception . . . .” Ireland,
supra note 18.
66
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 5:16-6:21; CEO speaks, supra note 16.
67
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 5:22-24.
68
False positives and false negatives cannot be isolated yet. Until studies
examine multiple aspects of the same event, an incorrect reading is both a false
positive and a false negative. Telephone Interview with Steven Laken (Apr. 9, 2007).
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surpass the abilities of available technologies69 and warrant
Since Cephos has not yet reached 90%
admissibility.70
71
accuracy, its primary focus is to test and refine its
technology.72 No Lie MRI is more confident, having already
begun accepting clients.73
As Cephos strives to cement error rates so that the
accuracy can be clearly expressed to the court,74 it has limited
its study population to people who are between the ages of
eighteen and fifty, “fairly well educated,”75 non-medicated, and
not current users of illegal drugs.76 Those with a past history of
psychological problems have been excluded, and Cephos is not
claiming the technology’s validity with psychopaths or
(Presumably, the science is more
pathological liars.77
complicated for these anomalies.) Rather, the company is
focusing on a prospective clientele of white-collar defendants
and civil litigants who it expects to be most analogous to its
test subjects.78
B.

How Polygraph Technology Works

In contrast to fMRI technology’s focus on brain activity,
polygraphs measure a set of physiological reactions associated
While the subject is being
with deceptive behavior.79
interviewed, the polygraph measures respiratory, electro69
Rosen, supra note 17, at 53; Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 5:22-6:13.
The new competing technologies in the lie-detection market are EEG or ‘brain
fingerprinting’ designed by Lawrence Farwell, see Barnaby J. Feder, Truth and Justice,
by the Blip of a Brainwave, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at F3, and voice stress technology,
see Douglas Heingartner, It’s the Way You Say It, Truth Be Told, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 1,
2004, at G1.
70
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 5:22-6:13.
71
Id. at 5:16-24.
72
Rosen, supra note 17, at 53.
73
McKenna, supra note 15, at 13.
74
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 3:7-11.
75
Id. at 4:2-5 (stating most test subjects had completed a high school
education).
76
Id. at 3:14-4:16 (employing urine testing). Cephos uses people of various
ethnicities, English and non-English speakers, and both full-time and part-time
employees.
77
Id. at 4:14-24.
78
Id. at 4:24-5:8. If its first commercial use is an indication, No Lie MRI has
also chosen to focus on civil litigants. Because this narrow set of cases is limited to
voluntary subjects, privacy concerns associated with involuntary testing are not
relevant.
79
American Polygraph Association, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.polygraph.org/faq.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
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dermal, and cardiovascular data.80 The typical procedure
tracks the subject’s breathing rate (using rubber tubes wrapped
around the chest), perspiration (by attaching metal sensors to
the fingers or palms), and both heart rate and blood pressure
(with an arm cuff).81 These factors measure added effort,82
stress, and nervousness, each of which tends to be present
when a person lies.83 The data charts are graphed and
analyzed.84 A polygraph examiner will typically ask questions
for which the answers are known in order to establish a
baseline reading of the physiological responses.85 Then the
examiner will compare these results to responses during more
probing questions.86 Because the exam is based on the subject’s
stress levels, the examiner’s behavior may affect the results.87
A polygraphist who is overly intimidated by, or particularly
suspicious of the subject can engage in covert or overt methods
to impact results.88
To assess polygraph accuracy, one must look at both
reliability and validity.89 Reliability measures the technique’s
replicability.90 That is to say, if several qualified polygraphists
can test the same subject and get similar results, then the
technique is reliable and may be evaluated for validity.91 Of the
several different questioning methods, two of the principal
techniques are generally considered very reliable.92

80

Id.
Id.
82
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“[T]he theory
seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the
utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood
pressure.”).
83
Michael J. Ligons, Comment, Polygraph Evidence: Where Are We Now?, 65
MO. L. REV. 209, 209 (2000).
84
American Polygraph Association, supra note 79.
85
Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence: Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
895, 905 (1998) (“The examiner’s role cannot be overstated, because it is the examiner
who decides whether there is sufficient indication of deception.”).
86
For a discussion of the various questioning techniques, see 4 DAVID L.
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 40:25-28 (2005-06).
87
Dan Eggen & Shankar Vedantam, Polygraph Results Often in Question:
CIA, FBI Defend Test’s Use in Probes, WASH. POST, May 1, 2006, at A1.
88
Id.
89
4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 40:25.
90
Id.
91
Id. (“Reliability and validity are related in that reliability is necessary, but
is not sufficient for validity.”).
92
Id. (The Control Question Test and the Guilty Knowledge Test both exhibit
near perfect replicability.).
81

2007]

fMRI LIE DETECTION

1363

To determine validity, on the other hand, researchers
are forced to look at clinical studies that present a tightly
controlled environment with confirmable results, as well as
field studies in which important real-life motivations and
complexities exist. Verifying accuracy is more treacherous in
field studies, however, because there are rarely reliable ways to
determine whether the subject has lied.93 Since validity varies
significantly depending on the questioning method, the quality
of the study, and whether it was clinical or in the field,
polygraph results are complex and controversial.94 The highestquality studies of the most successful questioning-method have
yielded average accuracy rates of 91% in laboratory tests and
90.5% in field studies.95 The other commonly used questioning
techniques had far lower accuracy rates.96 One court wrote:
[S]ome studies indicate [that] the potential error rate is, at best,
unknown. Eleven studies of polygraph evidence showed a wide
range of accuracy rates—from 48% to 90%—with an average rate of
71%. Two critics have maintained the Control Question Test
approach is little better than “the toss of a coin.”97

Furthermore, the National Research Council undertook an
extensive study of polygraphs by looking at effectiveness in
The study
legal proceedings and employment contexts.98
determined that polygraph “evidence [was] scanty and
scientifically weak” in part because “[t]he physiological
responses measured by the polygraph are not uniquely related
to deception.”99 Therefore, inaccurate polygraph techniques,
susceptibility to examiner error, and doubts regarding a link
between physiology and deception have stigmatized polygraph
technology.

93
Id. It is difficult to establish if a prisoner is in fact lying about the alleged
crime, for example.
94
Id.
95
4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, §§ 40:26, :30 (results of the Control
Question Test).
96
Id. §§ 40:27-28.
97
United States v. Cordoba, 991 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(quoting W. Iacono & D. Lykken, The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph
Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §
14-3 (D. Faigman et al. eds., 1997)).
98
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, BD. ON BEHAVIORAL, COGNITIVE, AND SENSORY
SCIENCES AND COMM. ON NAT’L STAT., THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 212 (2003).
99
Id.
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Key Distinctions Between fMRI Lie Detection and
Polygraphs

The fMRI technology should fare better under Daubert
than the polygraph due primarily to the fMRI test’s focus on
cognition,
increased
accuracy,
and
more
extensive
computerization.
1. The Cognitive/Emotional Distinction
Scientists maintain that fMRI technology examines the
primary cognitive process, not a secondary emotional response,
and should thus prove better against countermeasures than
the polygraph.100 It is common lore that polygraphs can be
Subjects have used counter-measures, such as
beat.101
sedatives, to dampen their autonomic responses and stressors,
such as flexing muscle or placing tacks in a shoe, to artificially
inflate or create stress reactions.102 Presumably, the same
techniques would not work to fool the fMRI because the fMRI
scan is analyzing cognitive tasks associated with answering a
question that take place regardless of stress levels.103
However, many fMRI studies are being done in other
fields to examine the extent to which people can alter which
neural pathways they use. Scientists studying pain control
have found they were able to train test subjects to “learn to
control activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex . . . , a
region putatively involved in pain perception and regulation.”104
Another study measured the extent to which paralyzed people
using a “Brain Computer Interface” could be trained to
regulate activity in specific brain regions so as to communicate
with an external device.105 Recently, German scientists found

100

Silberman, supra note 4, at 144.
The CIA agent Aldrich Ames passed several polygraph tests despite being
a Russian spy. Id.
102
American Psychological Association, The Truth About Lie Detectors,
PSYCHOL. MATTERS, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.psychologymatters.org/polygraphs.html;
Susan McCarthy, Passing the Polygraph, SALON, Mar. 2, 2000, http://archive.salon.com/
health/feature/2000/03/02/lie_detection/index.html.
103
Silberman, supra note 4, at 144.
104
R. Christopher deCharms et al., Control over Brain Activation and Pain
Learned by Using Real-Time Functional MRI, 102 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD.
OF SCI. IN THE U.S. (PNAS) 18626, 18626 (Dec. 20, 2005).
105
Thilo Hinterberger et al., Neural Mechanisms Underlying Control of a
Brain-Computer-Interface, 21 EUR. J. NEUROSCIENCE 3169, 3169 (2005) (“The data
support the assumption that human subjects learn the regulation of cortical excitation
101
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that healthy subjects could be taught relatively quickly to selfregulate their responsive brain oxygen level changes in certain
areas of the brain.106 While the study was aimed at helping
patients suffering paralysis or on respirators, the results
indicate that regional brain activation is trainable.107 If so,
perhaps one could train to lie without employing brain areas
typically associated with deception.
Nevertheless, amateur countermeasures by “normal”
individuals have been shown preliminarily to be ineffective and
subjects with anomalous behavior patterns (those who get
nervous easily or those who are having an unrelated emotional
response) presumably would not cause incorrect readings.108
Thus the fMRI test’s cognitive focus promises to be more
reliable than the polygraph’s physiological emphasis.109
2. Accuracy of fMRI
In theory, the fMRI will be far more accurate than the
polygraph because it homes in on the source of the lie rather
than the outward manifestations of the lie.110 In practice,
though, indications of this accuracy are only in early stages.
thresholds of large neuronal assemblies as a prerequisite for direct brain
communication.”).
106
N. Birbaumer & R. Sitaram, BCI-Regulation of Neuronal Substrates of
Emotions, 43 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY S20, S23-S24 (July 2006).
107
Id.
108
“Researchers believe that fMRI should be tougher to outwit because it
detects something much harder to suppress: neurological evidence of the decision to
lie.” Silberman, supra note 4, at 144. See also Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 21:922:13 (claiming perfect accuracy against amateur countermeasures such as holding
breath, delaying pressing a button, and visual imagery). Some scientists, in unrelated
lie-detection studies, have examined timing of responses as indicative of deception.
See, e.g., Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, From Flawed Self-Assessment to Blatant
Whoppers: The Utility of Voluntary and Involuntary Behavior in Detecting Deception,
24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 673 (2006). As stated above, no claims are being made that this
test will be effective for those suffering from neurological disorders. See supra text
accompanying notes 77-78.
109
Robert P. Mosteller, Commentary, Evidence History, the New Trace
Evidence, and Rumblings in the Future of Proof, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 538 (2006).
There are suggestions that the increased brain activity is in part due to the emotional
component of deception since some of the brain regions that the companies are
monitoring have been associated with emotional states. Kozel et al., Detecting
Deception, supra note 48, at 605.
110
Mosteller, supra note 109, at 538 (“Conceptually, this new technology
promises to advance lie detection greatly beyond the effectiveness of today’s
polygraph. . . . I do not know that we will ever achieve a technology that reliably
determines deception. Functional MRI may in the end prove no better than earlier liedetection technologies, but it has a potential to move the process of determining
deception forward even if it does not itself reach proficiency.”).
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The CEO of No Lie MRI boasts 90% accuracy,111 which would
make the fMRI more accurate than many polygraph tests.112
However, there are only a handful of fMRI lie-detection studies
and many of them tested only a small number of subjects.113
One recent study yielded a 92% accuracy rate for detecting
those who had lied and 70% for those who had told the truth.114
However, there were only eleven subjects.115 In a twenty-two
person study, the test accurately evaluated 99% of responses.116
The largest published study to date appeared in the
scientific, peer reviewed journal Biological Psychiatry and was
done by the scientists working in collaboration with Cephos.117
Sixty-one participants each took part in a mock-crime, stealing
either a ring or a watch.118 Then, the participants each
submitted to an fMRI exam in which they were asked whether
they had stolen the ring and whether they had stolen the
watch.119 They were instructed to deny stealing any object,
thus telling one lie and one truth.120 The subjects were
promised financial awards for being able to deceive the
machine.121 According to the authors of the study, this was the
first time that fMRI lie-detection results were analyzed by
researchers who were unaware of which subjects were in fact
lying.122 The researchers were able to differentiate the lies from
the truth, thereby accurately determining the item “stolen” in

111

Haddock, supra note 8, at E1.
See Brain Scans May Beat Polygraphs at Lie Detection, FORBES.COM, Jan. 31,
2006, http://www.forbes.com/lifestyle/health/feeds/hscout/2006/01/31/hscout530651.html;
Press Release, Medical University of Southern California, Scientists: fMRI Can Detect
Deception
with
90%
Accuracy
(Sept.
26,
2005),
available
at
http://www.musc.edu/pr/cephos.htm; Haddock, supra note 8, at E1.
113
Haddock, supra note 8, at E1.
114
Mohamed et al., supra note 55, at 679.
115
Id.
116
C. Davatzikos et al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with
Machine Learning Methods: Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663 (2005).
However, predictive accuracy was determined to be 88%. Id. See also Daniel
Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects With Fast EventRelated fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262 (2005).
117
Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605.
118
Id. at 605-06.
119
Id. at 605.
120
Id. at 605-06.
121
Id. at 606.
122
Cephos Corp., fMRI & Deception, http://www.cephoscorp.com/fmri_
deception.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). This would ensure that those who analyzed
the results would have no other information about the examinee other than the brain
scan. See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 14:24-25:15.
112
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90% to 93% of the subjects.123 The errors were not related to
the countermeasures some subjects employed to fool the
machine.124 Larger studies are underway, especially by those
commercially vested in the outcome,125 but it will be some time
before these future studies can be confirmed or replicated by
more neutral parties.
A recent symposium on fMRI lie detection at the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, co-sponsored by
Harvard University and the McGovern Institute for Brain
Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, elicited
opinions from three experts on the technology’s current
accuracy.126 The three tended “to agree that the fMRI shows
promise as a lie detector, but that current research is not
enough to support using it now.”127
Furthermore, fMRI tests face many of the same
challenges that have plagued polygraph validity studies: It is
difficult to replicate real-life motivations and complexities in
the lab and on volunteers; and it is difficult in the field to
distinguish an actual lie from a truth.128 Firstly, those who
volunteer for studies on university campuses are a different
Secondly, the
demographic than the average criminal.129
subjects are screened and those who use illegal drugs or show
signs of mental illness or medical complications may not
participate.130 Thirdly, in the lab, the subjects are asked about
recent, straightforward,131 relatively non-stigmatized events in
a neutral setting. Additionally, the laboratory subjects are not
under the kind of stress that is characteristic of one who is
falsely accused. Finally, the motivation of winning a small
cash award to fool the machine is quite different from that of
123

Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605.
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 21:9-22:13.
125
See, e.g., id. at 19:24-20:2. Frank Andrew Kozel is a scientific advisor for
Cephos, see Cephos Corp., Scientific Advisors, http://www.cephoscorp.com/
scientific.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007), and Christos Davatzikos is on the scientific
board of No Lie MRI, see No Lie MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/aboutUs/
ScienceBoard.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). Both men are responsible for a
significant portion of the current research on fMRI lie detection. See infra note 233.
126
Ireland, supra note 18.
127
Id. (expressing concern over the clinical studies inability to replicate realworld emotional stakes and lack of testing regarding countermeasures such as mental
imagery).
128
See 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 40:25.
129
Haddock, supra note 8, at E1.
130
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 4:9-16.
131
It is clear that one either took the watch or the ring. There is little room
for differing interpretations or viewpoints.
124
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avoiding a significant penal consequence.132 However, the CEO
of Cephos and the Biological Psychiatry study’s co-author,
claims to recognize various limitations.133 For now, Cephos
looks to work with primarily white-collar criminals and civil
litigants who typically face less serious consequences than, say,
violent criminals and suffer from fewer behavioral and mental
conditions.134 In the study’s conclusion, he notes: “Further work
is required to determine how well this technology will work in
different settings or populations.”135
3. Increased Computerization
To a considerable degree, a computer administers and
analyzes the fMRI such that the same properly developed and
tested software can be used to test each new subject.136 In fact,
Laken suggests that once the exam begins, there is typically no
interaction between the subject and another person.137 The
computer presents the question on a screen inside the MRI
chamber, receives the answer from a modified keyboard
controlled by the subject, randomly selects the next question,
and, at the completion of the exam, processes the results.138
The MRI takes multiple “snapshots” of the brain during the
The question order is
presentation of each question.139
essentially random, thus Cephos’ exam does not change as a
result of previous answers.140
The polygraph, however, has shown to be affected
substantially by human examiners.141 One scholar writes:
The examiner’s expertise is critical in (1) determining the suitability
of the subject for testing, (2) formulating proper test questions, (3)
establishing the necessary rapport with the subject, (4) detecting
attempts to mask or create chart reactions, or other

132

Haddock, supra note 8, at E1.
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 2:24-3:5 (“Clearly, unlike DNA
evidence, this technology is not going to be 100% accurate. There will be limitations to
its accuracy. And, as such, what will obviously need to happen is the triers will have to
figure out . . . how to use this evidence just like any other type of evidence . . .
presented in a courtroom.”).
134
Id. at 4:24-5:8.
135
Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605.
136
See Willing, supra note 11, at 5A.
137
See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 14:19-23, 48:5-9.
138
Both the polygraph and the fMRI questions are written by a human being.
139
See Ireland, supra note 18.
140
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 21:5-7.
141
Eggen & Vedantam, supra note 87, at A1.
133
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countermeasures, (5) stimulating the subject to react, and (6)
interpreting the charts.142

One might argue that the examiner’s question order may affect
the subject’s reaction. Psychologist William Iacono, suggested
that bias can present a problem with polygraphers:
Organizations that routinely test employees with the polygraph
find very few senior employees fail the test.143 Meanwhile 3040% of lower-level employees fail.144 Iacono suggests that
powerful subjects may intimidate polygraph examiners.145
“‘The director of the CIA just took a test,’ said Iacono. ‘How
would you like to be the examiner who gave him a test and say
he failed? What kind of a career would you have?’”146
Techniques such as numeric and computerized scoring
have been developed to eliminate polygraph examiner error
and variation.147 However, numeric scoring’s zero-to-three
system appears crude compared to the fMRI method.148 In
addition, computer scoring is relatively new and analyzed
“input [still] depends on the examiner’s ability, a subjective”
factor.149
Given these differences between polygraph and fMRI
technology, the few courts that have begun to welcome
polygraphs should also admit fMRI evidence. But more
importantly, even courts that regularly reject polygraphs will
have to independently examine fMRI evidence.
142

Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 905. See infra note 184.
Eggen & Vedantam, supra note 87, at A1.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. There is also the related “friendly polygrapher issue.” Giannelli,
Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 915 (“[A] polygraph examination privately
conducted by the defense may not be reliable because the fear of detection is not
sufficiently realistic.”).
147
Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 909-10. Furthermore,
federally administered polygraph results are usually “independently reviewed by
senior examiners.” Id. at 910.
148
Id. at 909-10 (“The subject’s behavioral reactions are not considered, only
the recorded chart reactions. There are several different scoring systems. The
[Department of Defense] Polygraph Institute and the University of Utah have
developed similar systems. . . . The scores range from 3 for a dramatic reaction to a
control question to -3 for the same type of reaction to a relevant question. Noticeable
but smaller reactions are scored 1 or -1. A lack of a significant reaction is scored 0.
Total scores of 6 or higher indicate truthfulness, while -6 or lower indicate deception.
Scores that fall in between are considered inconclusive. The primary advantage of the
numerical approach is that it ‘helps to ensure a rigorous, semi-objective evaluation of
the physiological information contained in the charts.’ Numerical scoring reduces, but
does not eliminate, subjectivity.” (footnotes omitted)).
149
Id. at 909-10, 922.
143
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WHY FMRI SHOULD BE ADMITTED BASED ON THE
EVIDENTIARY DOCTRINE

A.

The Daubert Analysis

[Vol. 72:4

1. Basic Doctrine
Until recently, polygraphs were generally inadmissible
at trial.150 In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in Frye v. United States, determined that
any scientific theory that was not sufficiently accepted in the
scientific community should not be admissible in court.151
Because this landmark case on scientific evidence centered on
polygraph evidence and the Court determined that the
technique did not meet this standard, the polygraph test was
dealt a serious blow from which it has never recovered.152 Even
though the Court made clear that the polygraph was not
admissible because it was not “sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance,”153 and not because of an inherent
flaw in the science, little re-examination was done over the
years to determine whether the level of acceptance had
improved.154
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,155 however, changed the
landscape of scientific evidence admissibility that in turn
affected the polygraph analysis.156 The Court held that “the
Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence,”157 and that Rule 702 now governs expert evidence
without reference to Frye’s “general acceptance” doctrine.158
The Court also pointed to the Federal Rules’ pervasive “‘liberal
thrust [in] . . . relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion
From these two indications, the Court
testimony.’”159
150
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 311 n.7 (1998). See also Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 40:1;
Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 900-01.
151
293 F. at 1014.
152
Jodi Meyers, Lee v. Martinez: Does Polygraph Evidence Really Satisfy
Daubert?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 391, 393-94 (2006).
153
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
154
Meyers, supra note 152, at 393.
155
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
156
Meyers, supra note 152, at 393-94.
157
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
158
Id. at 588.
159
Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
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concluded, “[t]hat [Frye’s] austere standard, absent from, and
incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be
applied in federal trials.”160
The Court, however, also interpreted Rule 702 to
provide trial judges with a significant gate-keeping function:
“[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but
reliable.”161 Before discussing the Frye test, the Court discussed
the definition of scientific knowledge:
The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science. Similarly, the word “knowledge” connotes
more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term
“applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred
from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.”162

The Court went on to acknowledge that assertions of a
scientific theory need not be “‘known’ to a certainty” because
“arguably, there are no certainties in science.”163 However,
testimony must “be derived by the scientific method . . . [and]
supported by appropriate validation.”164
The Court did not entirely turn its back on Frye.
Rather, it held that a trial judge may look at the theory’s
general acceptance as one of many factors in determining
whether to admit testimony based on a scientific theory or
technique.165 These other factors include but are not limited to:
whether the theory or technique can be tested, whether it “has
been subjected to peer review and publication,” “the known or
potential rate of error,” and “the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling.”166 Rule 702 was modified after Daubert

160

Id. at 589.
Id.
162
Id. at 590 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)).
163
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
164
Id. (“In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to
‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.”).
165
Id. at 594.
166
Id. at 593-94. Other factors trial judges have considered include:
161

(1) Whether experts . . . have developed their opinions expressly for purposes
of testifying [in the case]. . . . (2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably
extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion. . . .
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative
explanations. . . . (4) Whether the expert is being as careful as he would be in
his regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes (quotations omitted).
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to codify the trial judge’s new gate keeping function.167 Under
the federal rule, the judge may exclude testimony that is not
“the product of reliable principles and methods.”168 Under Rule
702, the court has considerable discretion169 in its rationale for
deciding that expert testimony is reliable and relevant to the
matter at issue.170 Furthermore, during discussion of Rule 403
which requires a court to exclude evidence when its prejudicial
effect substantially outweighs its probative value, the Court
warned: “‘Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of
this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against
probative force under Rule 403 . . . exercises more control over
experts than over lay witnesses.’”171
The trial courts, however, have so embraced the gatekeeping function that the liberalizing aspirations172 of the
Daubert opinion have been thwarted.173 Since Daubert, more
parties have sought exclusion of scientific evidence and more
have succeeded.174 In addition, judges have been examining
scientific evidence more rigorously and excluding a larger
percentage of it.175 At least one study shows that making
general acceptance merely one of several factors failed to lessen
Perhaps the
this criterion as a bar to admissibility.176
additional factors merely increased grounds upon which judges
might exclude evidence, because if a piece of evidence appeared
167

FED. R. EVID. 702 (amended in 2000).
Id. The Court may still exclude testimony in which the testimony is not
“based upon sufficient facts or data,” or if “the witness has [poorly] applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Id.
169
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (holding that
the “trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to
go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable”).
170
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
171
Id. at 595 (citing 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (S.D. Ga. 1991)).
172
See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in
a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1316 (2004).
173
Vickers, supra note 32, at 110. (“Daubert, as applied by judges, has
heightened the bar for admissibility and, accordingly, reduced the proportion of
evidence deemed admissible.”).
174
Id. at 109-10. A 2001 RAND Corporation study concluded that twenty
percent more evidentiary challenges were successful in the years after Daubert than
prior to the decision. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:34.
175
Christina L. Studebaker et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices,
and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 309, 330 (2002).
176
Press Release, RAND Corporation, Federal District Judges are Screening
Expert Evidence More Strictly (Nov. 29, 2001), http://www.rand.org/news/Press/
expert.html.
168
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to be weak under any factor, a judge could justify exclusion.177
Academics have also pushed courts “to re-evaluate existing
Regarding
presumptions about expert admissibility.”178
polygraphs, one scholar argues, “growing evidence indicates
that the proffered expert testimony is reliable, and Daubert has
given courts the opportunity[,] if not the duty,” to broach the
issue anew.179
In the wake of Daubert, the courts were again “forced to
address polygraph evidence.”180 If the courts are free to
consider the polygraph’s other attributes, perhaps motivated
counsel could take on the court’s seemingly forgone conclusion
that the test was not generally accepted in the scientific
community. Furthermore, counsel may also have judged that
the watershed case and the more open-ended language within
it might permit a re-tooled argument for the polygraph’s recent
general acceptance.
Nearly half of the circuit courts have re-evaluated
polygraphs after Daubert.181 In United States v. Posado,182 the
Fifth Circuit considered the Daubert factors and held open the
possibility that the polygraph could satisfy Rule 702 in some
circumstances, although it did not in the case before it. The
court first noted that the polygraph test had grown more
sophisticated since Frye, now with “modern instrumentation”
measuring more than just blood pressure.183 The court asserted
that the error rate was measurable and attributable to a
177
Vickers, supra note 32, at 120-21 (Using “multi-factored tests . . . is too
flexible and leaves too much discretion in the [judge’s] hands. . . . Its application is
likely to produce inconsistent, arbitrary, and unpredictable results.”).
178
Ric Simmons, Conquering the Province of the Jury: Expert Testimony and
the Professionalization of Fact-Finding, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1013, 1046 (2006).
179
Id. See Ronald L. Carlson, Navigating the Nuances of Modern Expert
Witness Law: How to Teach About Experts, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115, 1128 (2006)
(“Daubert asks courts and scholars to review formerly rejected technical processes to
determine if their rejection is based upon unreliability of the process, or if it simply
results from the inherent conservatism of the law.” (emphasis added)).
180
Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 903.
181
See Simmons, supra note 178, at 1042-43 (citing United States v. Gilliard,
133 F.3d 809 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402 (10th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Beyer, 106 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cordoba,
104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding per se ban overturned by Daubert); United
States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 728-30 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Posado, 57
F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995)).
182
57 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 1995).
183
Id. at 434. While this observation about sophistication does not seem to fit
in to any of the Daubert inquiries, it seems to play a role in the court’s analysis. When
Judge Jed Rakoff expressed his hesitancies about the new technology, he acknowledged
his regard for the underlying science. Ireland, supra note 18.
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minimum number of factors.184 Furthermore, according to the
court, the error rate lay between 70% and 90%, a variation that
“exists in many of the disciplines and for much of the scientific
evidence we routinely find admissible under Rule 702.”185
Finally, increased standardization, peer review, testing, and
general acceptance outside the courtroom all influenced the
court to decide that the test is permissible under Daubert.186
The Ninth Circuit has also held that Daubert overruled
the per se ban on polygraph evidence, and it instructed the
lower court to do a Daubert analysis.187 The lower court
conducted an extensive two-day hearing on the polygraph,
however, and found that the polygraph did not pass the
Daubert test.188 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that “the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
‘polygraph evidence does not presently satisfy the Daubert
standards.’”189 The Tenth Circuit has likewise determined that
Daubert applied to polygraphs, but stated that the lower court’s
Daubert analysis did not abuse discretion in finding that
“nothing in Daubert would disturb the settled precedent that
polygraph evidence is neither reliable nor admissible to show
that one is truthful.”190 The Fourth Circuit has continued to
apply a ban, but has discussed at length an inclination to soon
employ a Daubert analysis to polygraphs.191
One circuit court simply avoided the question of
polygraph admissibility.192 Two years after Daubert, the Second
Circuit affirmed a lower court’s exclusion of polygraph evidence
under Rule 403 based on the problematic nature of the
polygraph questions posed to the defendant.193 The court found
184
“Remaining controversy about test accuracy is almost unanimously
attributed to variations in the integrity of the testing environment and the
qualifications of the examiner.” Posado, 57 F.3d at 436.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997).
188
United States v. Cordoba, 991 F.Supp. 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“The court
finds polygraphy has not achieved general acceptance in the scientific community for
courtroom use, the error rate for real-life polygraph tests is unknown, and there are no
controlling standards for polygraphy.”), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
189
United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
190
United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997).
191
United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1999). See also Ligons, supra note 83,
at 218 n.76 (summary of states that employ a per se ban).
192
United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995).
193
Id.
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the test results irrelevant because three questions were not
sufficiently and precisely tailored to the issues of the case.194
The court did not rely on Rule 702 because “the record . . .
simply d[id] not provide the proper opportunity to explore the
validity of polygraph evidence under Rule 702.”195
The Supreme Court most recently addressed polygraph
admissibility in 1998 and held that a per se rule excluding
polygraph
evidence
for
criminal
defendants
was
196
The case involved Military Rule of Evidence
constitutional.
707(a), which bans polygraph evidence from court-martial
proceedings.197 The Court found that there was “no consensus
that polygraph evidence is reliable”198 and that disagreement in
lower courts emphasized the controversy.199 The Court held
that it was not arbitrary for the President (who dictates
military law) to deem polygraphs unreliable given the
widespread disagreement regarding accuracy.200 Thus, the
exclusion of the polygraph evidence was based on legitimate
reasons, despite a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process.201
In a part of his opinion supported only by a minority,
Justice Thomas added that “preserving the court members[’]
role in determining credibility . . . and avoiding litigation that
is collateral to the primary purpose of the trial” also support
exclusion.202 In the opinion of the Court, Daubert did not
prohibit a ban on a particular form of scientific evidence:203
“[T]here is simply no way to know in a particular case whether
a polygraph examiner’s conclusion is accurate, because certain
doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph
exams.”204 United States v. Scheffer dealt a significant blow to
polygraphs both because it has been interpreted as finding

194

Id.
Id. at 669.
196
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 305 (1998).
197
Id. at 306-07.
198
Id. at 309.
199
Id. at 310-11.
200
Id. at 312.
201
Id.
202
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309.
203
Id. at 311 n.7.
204
Id. at 312 (“We cannot say, then, that presented with such widespread
uncertainty, the President acted arbitrarily or disproportionately in promulgating a per
se rule excluding all polygraph evidence.”). Justice Thomas also justifies the Court’s
decision on the Province of the Jury doctrine. Id. at 312-15. See also infra Part III.D.
195
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polygraphs inaccurate and as revitalizing the polygraph’s
Province of the Jury concern.205
Thus, many courts have acknowledged that Daubert
mandated re-examining polygraph evidence. The new analysis,
however, has been no more welcoming of the technology.
2. Applying Daubert to fMRI Lie Detection
At some point in the near future, if not at present, a
reasonable doctrinal analysis should allow fMRI lie-detection
technology to be admissible in court. Many of the Daubert
factors can be met, and, given an appropriate (albeit limited)
set of circumstances, the evidence would be relevant under
Rule 403 and sufficiently outside the narrow Province of the
Jury. Furthermore, the technology, though young, tests better
than commonly permitted evidence.
a. Testability/Falsifiability
The first Daubert factor, testability (or falsifiability),
requires that one be able to verify that the same test performed
the same way will lead to consistent results. While many
believe further testing is required, at some point in the near
future, a court could reasonably find that fMRI’s are testable.
Scholars interpret this factor to mean whether a scientific
theory has been tested and is capable of being tested in the
future.206 Daubert requires judges “to distinguish the methods
of science from those methods that merely imitate science.”207
While the Supreme Court did not indicate how trial courts
should determine testability,208 in practice, courts tend to
require testability rather than weigh it as one of many
factors.209 One scholar has suggested that “a judge must find
that the general principles and theories underlying an expert’s
opinion are reliable and valid. This responsibility includes an
evaluation of the methodology used to make a specific inference
205
At least one scholar disapproves of the revitalization. Bush, supra note 23,
at 552 (“Multiple federal circuit courts cited the decision as approving of per se rules
against polygraph admissibility as well as for the general proposition that polygraph
evidence is unreliable. The Seventh Circuit even misconstrued Scheffer to stand for the
proposition that courts should exclude polygraph evidence because it infringes on the
jury’s responsibilities.” (footnotes omitted)).
206
1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:15.
207
Id. § 1:16.
208
Id. § 1:15.
209
Id.

2007]

fMRI LIE DETECTION

1377

since the validity of such methodologies . . . depend[s] on
general principles and theories.”210
The fMRI technology is capable of being tested because
(1) the procedure is repeatable and (2) the results can be
validated, at least in a clinical setting.211 Any number of
subjects can be submitted to precisely the same technology, and
results may be analyzed by a single computer algorithm.
Because three aspects of the fMRI exam are more automated
than the traditional polygraph exam, a court should find the
fMRI to be a more “testable” technology.212
First, the questions during an fMRI are presented to the
subject on a computer screen and not by a human interviewer.
One major flaw in testing polygraphs is that some interviewers
are better than others. What a polygraph exam measures is
the subject’s precise physiological reaction during question and
answer.213 Nervousness, stress, anxiety, and fear inform one’s
psycho-physiological reaction.214 Therefore, how the question is
asked and who the examiner is affect the test results.215 For
example, the examiner’s tone of voice, intonation, attitude,
physical posture, and eye contact may all lead one subject to be
more nervous than if the interrogator were to ask the question
differently.216 Moreover, an examiner’s bias might cause the
examiner to use subtle techniques to bring about a particular
result.217
Second, the fMRI presents the questions in a random
order. While this is thought to be helpful in thwarting

210
Id § 1:17. (“If a body of data supports both valid generalizations and the
methods employed to determine specific propositions, the jury should evaluate what
weight to accord the testimony. . . . In short, judges should evaluate under Rule 104(a)
the general principles or methods by which experts derive their opinions about specific
causation. . . . [O]nce the court has determined that [such] methods are sufficiently
valid and that they were employed in the particular case, the trier of fact must assess
the weight the evidence receives.”).
211
Id. § 1:15. However, it is difficult to test the technology under real-world
conditions because real-world incentives, such as avoiding prison or receiving a
windfall, are hard to mimic and may affect a subject’s cognitive activity far beyond an
imposed clinical incentive.
212
In both the fMRI and the polygraph exams the particular practitioner
composes the questions.
213
Willing, supra note 11, at 5A.
214
See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
215
See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
216
A base line reading is taken during a polygraph so that any overarching
anxiety or intimidation from the exam itself or the interrogator may be taken into
account. See supra text accompanying note 85.
217
See supra text accompanying note 88.
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Any
countermeasures,218 it also standardizes the exam.
strategy employed in the sequencing of questioning would have
to be tested. If every facility employed a different strategy,
each strategy would have to be tested. Furthermore, the
strategy would be hard to specify given the variety of fact
patterns and, thus, would make the technique especially hard
to test for accuracy.
Third, the fMRI results are interpreted by a computer
algorithm, whereas traditional polygraphs require the
examiner to interpret the test results. Error, in a polygraph
analysis, may result from mistake or bias.219 There is concern
even from within the polygraph community regarding the
proper training of examiners.220 Additionally, any examiner is
subject to personal feelings and may be influenced by his
subjective impressions.221 Since it is interpreted by a computer,
the fMRI is less susceptible to “confirmation bias.”222 The
computer first does a number of preliminary tasks such as
correcting for small head movements that affect picture
quality.223 Then, the computer determines which brain regions
218
This is all highly speculative because little research has been done
regarding fMRI countermeasures. However, one underlying principle of fMRI lie
detection is that people have an initial impulse to tell the truth, which must be
suppressed in order to concoct and tell a lie. If there were some particularly
imaginative or deceptive state that one could maintain during an exam that would
lessen the initial truthful impulse, the random question order would presumably make
this more difficult to keep up. See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 4:21-24, 22:1423:3. The subject does not know whether the upcoming questions are going to pertain
to the lie or to some innocuous subject (used to establish baseline readings, such as “Is
your name Bob?”) that would require a truthful answer. See id. at 20:23-21:13.
219
“Remaining controversy about [polygraph] test accuracy is almost
unanimously attributed to variations in the integrity of the testing environment and
the qualifications of the examiner.” United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir.
1995).
220
Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 923 (“the [Department of
Defense, Polygraph Institute] trains all federal polygraph examiners. It ‘is the only
program known to base its curriculum on forensic psychophysiology, and conceptual,
abstract, and applied knowledge that meet the requirements of a master’s degree-level
of study.’ The qualifications standards include a college degree (or equivalent), two
years’ experience as an investigator, and a six-month internship . . . . In addition, 80
hours of continuing instruction are required annually. Outside of federally trained
examiners, few have such qualifications.” (citations omitted)).
221
It is important to note that subjective determinations are routinely
permitted in expert evidence such as fingerprint analyses, toolmark evidence, and
handwriting identification. Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship
Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 982 n.146
(2006).
222
See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Challenges to Fingerprints, 42 CRIM. L.
BULL. 5 (2006) (“a well-established phenomenon that is frequently ignored in forensic
work”).
223
Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 55:9-16.
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were activated during each question.224 A simple comparison of
area activation across control and non-control questions
indicates deception because it directly correlates to the added
mental effort involved.225 A well-tested computer program is
likely to interpret results more reliably than a single
practitioner.226
b. Peer Review and Publication
The Supreme Court noted that peer review and
publication is a factor to consider in determining whether a
particular scientific method is worthy of admission under FRE
The Court suggests that peer reviewed publications
702.227
indicate that the scientific principles have been subjected to
scientific scrutiny by those best suited to judge their
legitimacy.228 Even publications that are not peer reviewed are
helpful towards a Daubert analysis because they disseminate
the ideas to the scientific community who may then seek to
challenge or confirm the results.229 The Supreme Court found,
however, that the scientific theory need not be beyond
reproach.
Flaws detected during peer review “do not
necessarily equate to a lack of scientific validity,” but may
simply affect the testimony’s weight.230
When the Sixth Circuit considered the admissibility of
DNA evidence soon after Daubert, the government produced six
publications, each dealing with a specific aspect of DNA
technology.
The court also considered the extensive
publications on DNA matching and the “general procedures
224

See supra Part II.A.
See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 40:10-12, 43:2-24.
226
Question composition is not done by a machine and may present a variable.
In real-world situations, it is much more difficult to determine whether a statement is
actually true or false. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 912.
Furthermore, while the fMRI has been tested by several teams of scientists, critics may
point out that most of these scientists have commercial interest in the technology. See
supra note 125.
227
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993); United
States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 559 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding DNA evidence admissible
under Daubert).
228
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; Bonds, 12 F.3d at 559. To be published in a
true peer review scientific journal, authors submit work, receive comments from the
journal’s outside scientists who evaluate the results, and make appropriate changes
sufficient to satisfy the journal’s editors. Id. at 559 n.16.
229
“[S]ubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of
‘good science,’ in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
230
Id. at 593-94; Bonds, 12 F.3d at 559.
225
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used to come up with the forensic results” as further evidence
of peer review.231 Even though some of the publications offered
by the prosecution were not technically peer reviewed scientific
journals, the court acknowledged their value in exposing the
procedures to the larger scientific community.232
The fMRI scholarship on deception has been subjected
to peer review and published in scholarly journals in at least
twenty instances.233 All twenty articles have been published
within the last six years, and five have come out since the
beginning of 2006. Even if a test case is only one or two years
away, by that time there will likely be even more publications
available.

231

Bonds, 12 F.3d at 560.
Id. at 559 n.16.
233
See generally Nobuhito Abe et al., Deceiving Others: Distinct Neural
Responses of the Prefrontal Cortex and Amygdala in Simple Fabrication and Deception
with Social Interactions, 19 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 287 (2007); C. Davatzikos et
al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine Learning Methods:
Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663 (2005); M. Gamer et al., Covariations
Among fMRI, Skin Conductance, and Behavioral Data During Processing of Concealed
Information, 28 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING ___ (forthcoming 2007); G. Ganis et al., Neural
Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX
830 (2003); N.J. Gordon et al., Integrated Zone Comparison Polygraph Technique
Accuracy with Scoring Algorithms, 87 PHYSIOLOGY BEHAV. 251 (2006); Kozel et al.,
Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605; F. Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy
Young Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 295 (2004); Kozel, et
al., Neural Correlates of Deception, supra note 47, at 852; Daniel D. Langleben et al.,
Telling Truth From Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26
HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262 (2005); D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During
Simulated Deception: An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15
NEUROIMAGE 727 (2002); Tatia M. Lee et al., Neural Correlates of Feigned Memory
Impairment, 28 NEUROIMAGE 305 (2005); Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 157 (2002);
Donald H. Marks et al., Determination of Truth from Deception Using Functional MRI
and
Cognitive
Engrams,
5
INTERNET
J.
RADIOLOGY
(2006),
http://www.ispub.com/ostia/index.php?xmlFilePath =journals/ijra/vol5n1/engram.xml;
Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling About an
Ecologically Valid Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation—
Initial Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679, 679 (2006); J. M. Nunez et al., Intentional
False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive
Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE 267 (2005); K. Luan Phan et al., Neural Correlates of Telling
Lies: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study at 4 Tesla, 12 ACAD. RADIOLOGY
164 (2005); Sean A. Spence et al., A Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception:
Evidence From Functional Neuroimaging, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
SOC’Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1755 (2004); Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and
Functional Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEURO REPORT 2849
(2001); Donald T. Stuss et al., The Frontal Lobes Are Necessary for ‘Theory of Mind,’
124 BRAIN 279 (2001); Yaling Yang et al., Prefrontal White Matter in Pathological
Liars, 187 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 320 (2005). This list does not include publications in
scientific journals on the bioethics and legal implications of fMRI lie-detection efforts.
232
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Furthermore, the science that underlies fMRI lie
detection has been subjected to rigorous peer-evaluation by the
larger scientific community.234 Many of the nation’s leading
institutions have become centers for both fMRI tests and brainmapping—these technologies were not only scrutinized in the
past, but they serve as the foundation for a broad, new frontier
of study.235 Scientists are using fMRI technology to understand
from where in the brain a disabled person’s seizures emanate,
to steer clear of important neurological regions during brain
surgery, to better promote stroke recovery, and to diagnose presymptom Alzheimer’s.236 Each of these fMRI applications has
been subjected to peer reviewed publication.237 If the court
finds publications on fMRI lie detection too sparse,238 it might
consider publication on other aspects of the same technology.
As the admission of DNA evidence indicates, technology
spawned by major scientific fields carries considerable weight.
c. Error Rate
The Daubert Court listed error rate as a consideration
for admissibility of scientific evidence.239 Several fMRI studies
have produced error rates for determining whether a subject
was telling a truth or falsehood. The largest study yielded an
error rate of only 7% to 10%.240 While the Supreme Court did
not specify what error rates would be acceptable,241 this error-

234

Ongoing peer-evaluation, the scrutiny of the entire scientific community,
occurs post-publication and is distinct from the limited peer review done prior to
publication in a journal.
235
The Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Center at Columbia
University and the Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging at Harvard
University are two of the centers engaged in a wide variety of fMRI studies. See
Columbia University, Columbia Functional MRI Research Center, http://www.fmri.org/
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007); Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging,
http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/martinos/flashHome.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
See also The fMRI Data Center, http://www.fmridc.org/f/fmridc (maintained by
Dartmouth College) (last visited Mar. 30, 2007); Funcational Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fmri_intro/fmri_intro.php (maintained by Oxford
University) (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
236
Parry & Matthews, supra note 36.
237
Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605.
238
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993)
(acknowledging “[s]ome propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too
limited interest to be published.”).
239
Id. at 594.
240
Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 48, at 605.
241
1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:20.
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rate is certainly helpful to the jury.242 Moreover, this error-rate
is more calculable than that of many other types of admissible
forensic evidence, including fingerprint analyses, for which
there is “surprisingly little conventional science . . . to support
the claims of the fingerprint examination community,”243 and
firearm identification.244 Furthermore, it should be noted that
ordinary eyewitness testimony245 is routinely presented to
juries despite problematic error rates—it is the leading cause of
false convictions.246 Therefore, a scientifically measurable error
rate of approximately 10% should not disqualify fMRI
evidence.247
Justice Blackmun specified that “the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s
operation” should also be a factor in judging a technology.248
The computerization of the fMRI test allows considerable
standardization.249 The presentation of the questions, the speed
at which they are administered, and the timing of the MRI
imaging can all be administered, monitored, and analyzed by a

242

FED. R. EVID. 702. Any evidence that is better than chance is presumably

helpful.
243
4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 34:1 (“Today, a thoughtful and
scientifically literate proponent of expert fingerprint identification testimony,
compelled . . . to demonstrate the validity of fingerprint identification claims in front of
a thoughtful and scientifically literate judge, would face a number of serious
difficulties. . . . Proficiency testing does not support the claimed error rate of zero or of
the unanimity of opinion asserted by fingerprint examiners.” (citations omitted)). One
“court found that ‘[e]ven allowing for the possibility of individual error, the error rate
with latent print identification is vanishingly small when it is subject to fair
adversarial testing and challenge.’” Id. § 1:29 (quoting U.S. v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp.
2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000)). However, “[t]he court never explained how it knew this
to be so.” Id.
244
See Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and
Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
1, 24-25 (2005) (“[I]t is questionable whether a meaningful error rate for the subjective
method of firearms and toolmark examination can even be calculated. Proficiency tests
may indicate particular examiners’ ability to reach correct identity conclusions at a
given time. However, unless examiners commit themselves to specific, articulable
criteria for determining when the resemblances between toolmarks are so great that
they must have come from the same tool, a given examiner’s proficiency at a certain
time is no guarantee of similar proficiency in the future.” (footnote omitted)).
245
An eyewitness’s testimony is not considered expert evidence and therefore
avoids a Daubert analysis.
246
1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:34.
247
Some argue that the error rate of a technology that goes directly to
credibility should be more stringent than for other types of evidence. See infra Part
III.B.2.
248
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
249
See Laken Transcript, supra note 9, at 48:3-16.
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software package.250 A voxel count, which indicates the extent
of the blood oxygenation, is also numeric and could thus be
standardized.251
d. General Acceptance
Despite overruling Frye, the Court kept “general
acceptance” a factor in determining admissibility of scientific
evidence.252 Here, fMRI lie detection would probably stumble
because the technology is new and rather shocking.
Nevertheless the fMRI technology used in this technique might
still be seen as generally accepted by scientists because it is
used so extensively at the highest levels of various medical
research fields. While this is not an explicit consideration
under Daubert, it does seem to affect judges because one of
Daubert’s principles was to exclude “junk science.”253 The Three
Tesla magnetic resonance imaging machines working in
concert with intricate computer algorithms and cutting-edge
brain-mapping all produced by scientists associated with such
institutions as Columbia University, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and Harvard University seem a far cry
from snake oil.
B.

Other Rules
1. Applying Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to fMRI LieDetection Technology

Even if a court finds that polygraphs satisfy Daubert
and Rule 702, the test is vulnerable to a Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 analysis.254 Rule 403 allows a trial judge to
exclude evidence when its prejudicial effect outweighs its
probative value.255 The prejudicial effect could come from
“unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
250
See id. at 15:25-16:8, 48:14-49:11 (comparing this to events in the famous
Wen Ho Lee spy scandal in which two government agencies disagreed about the
subject’s polygraph results).
251
Id. at 38:16-20.
252
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
253
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1083, 1097 (2006).
254
United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999).
255
FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”).
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jury.”256 For example, jurors might overvalue polygraph results
despite warnings of the test’s limited accuracy, or the court
may determine that the evidence’s reliability (or lack thereof)
could simply confuse or mislead the jury. In either case, the
court could exclude the evidence under Rule 403.
While fMRI evidence is also subject to an error rate and
might be overvalued by the fact-finder, the same could be said
for many admissible forms of evidence such as fingerprint
evidence, toolmark analysis, and eyewitness testimony.257 The
vividness of some of the fMRI images might lead a trial judge
to be more concerned with prejudice because any false sense of
familiarity with the science could increase the evidence’s undue
prejudice.258 However, it is difficult to justify such an exclusion
given the opportunity to cross-examine.
In addition,
eyewitness testimony, which is routinely admitted, is similarly
powerful evidence and subject to substantial error. The jury is
simply trusted to weigh the testimony accordingly. Therefore,
while courts might use Rule 403 to exclude fMRI results
because the error rates are confusing or the technology is too
seductive, there are few distinct characteristics of fMRI
evidence to warrant the exclusion. Any such decision may
more readily suggest a court’s vague uneasiness with this
“mind reading” technology rather than a specific prejudice.259
2. Applying the “Province of the Jury” Doctrine to fMRI
Lie-Detection Technology
Even if the judge determines that testimony is
admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403, the
offering party may face an objection that lie-detection

256
Id. Courts have found that polygraphs fail a 403 analysis for this reason.
See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999).
257
See supra text accompanying notes 244, 280-83.
258
Jennifer Mnookin argues that one reason fingerprint evidence is so
powerful is because the jury can see the evidence for itself. Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Fingerprint Evidence in the Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 26-27 (2001)
(“[T]he fingerprints themselves, as much as the expert opinion about the fingerprints,
seem to constitute the evidence.”).
259
The next section will separately address the Province of the Jury doctrine
although courts sometimes deal with this under a 403 analysis. See United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 314 (1998) (finding that “jurisdictions may legitimately
determine that the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to
abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt”); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d
225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that “polygraph evidence has grave potential for
interfering with the deliberative process”).
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testimony invades the Province of the Jury.260 For the last 150
years, the Province of the Jury doctrine has kept witnesses
from testifying about their own inferences and opinions unless
they arose from a specialized skill that would aid the jury in its
decision.261 The reasoning stemmed from the notion that the
jurors ought to use their own opinions and inferences to make a
decision and that third party opinion testimony might cloud the
jury’s perspective.262 The courts recognized that jurors still
needed expert advice in fields such as engineering, medicine, or
business to “enable [them] to draw conclusions from the facts
However, over time, courts have
more accurately.”263
increasingly permitted expert evidence in more areas.264
Presently, “experts have gained the right to assist the jury on
almost every issue.”265
One major fear in allowing lie detectors into court
proceedings is that they will take away from the jury its role as
fact-finder, specifically in the witness-credibility arena.266 One
might argue that a jury will no longer have to watch a witness
testify, hunt for deceptive behavior, and decide whether or not
to believe the witness, because the fMRI will indicate who is
lying and who is not.267 Some might even imagine that many

260
See Simmons, supra note 178, at 1019, 1032 (discussion of court’s similar
treatment of eyewitness experts: “Courts generally cited one of two reasons for
precluding the testimony: either the expert could not provide any information beyond
what could be provided by cross-examination and the jurors’ common sense (and
therefore the testimony was not helpful), or the proffered testimony impermissibly
infringed on the jury’s traditional role of determining credibility.”).
261
Id. at 1018-19.
262
Id. at 1019.
263
Id.
264
Id. at 1015.
265
Id. See also Carlson, supra note 179, at 1126-27 (“An expert on mental
states of accused persons cannot categorically announce that the defendant had the
mens rea to commit a specific crime. Nor may an expert invade the province of the jury
in a civil or criminal case. She does so, among other ways, by attempting to testify that
a testator lacked mental capacity to sign a will, in a will contest case.” (footnote
omitted)).
266
Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at 916.
267
Justice Thomas wrote:

Jurisdictions, in promulgating rules of evidence, may legitimately be
concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive weight to the opinions
of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise and at times
offering, as in respondent’s case, a conclusion about the ultimate issue in the
trial. Such jurisdictions may legitimately determine that the aura of
infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to abandon their
duty to assess credibility and guilt. Those jurisdictions may also take into
account the fact that a judge cannot determine, when ruling on a motion to
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trials, specifically those revolving around which party is telling
the truth, might not require a jury at all—simply have the
parties or witnesses submit to an fMRI exam.268 While the
Province of the Jury doctrine has eroded as reliance on expert
testimony has grown, courts have most strongly guarded the
jury’s witness credibility task.269 Despite arguments that there
is reasonable justification for such effort,270 the fMRI will not
take credibility determination from the jury, nor will it greatly
alter the trial process as it stands today.271 Rather, fMRI
evidence will help the jury determine who is telling the truth,
but at the same time require juries (as they often must) to
parse various reasons why proffered evidence may not be
convincing in a particular case.272
There has been much confusion273 and controversy274
surrounding the Province of the Jury concerns. Nevertheless,
courts regularly cite the doctrine with respect to credibility
testimony.275 Some scholars argue that exclusion of credibility
testimony on Province of the Jury grounds is inappropriate.276
First, many courts found that Rule 704 implicitly abolished the
Province of the Jury doctrine along with explicitly rejecting the
“Ultimate Issue” principle.277 In United States v. Scheffer,
Justice Kennedy discussed Rule 704 and professed he “had
thought this tired [Province of the Jury] argument had long
since been given its deserved repose as a categorical rule of

admit polygraph evidence, whether a particular polygraph expert is likely to
influence the jury unduly.
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1998).
268
The constitutional right to a trial by jury would, of course, prohibit such a
procedure. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
269
Simmons, supra note 178, at 1029.
270
See infra note 281 and accompanying text.
271
Pardo, supra note 10, at 305.
272
This may, however, lead to the problematic battle of the experts. See, e.g.,
Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 684-85 (2001) (“in which hired
guns clash with opposing opinions, neither of which is any more empirically
supportable than the other”).
273
See Simmons, supra note 178, at 1020 & n.39.
274
Wigmore argued that excluding evidence based on Province of the Jury had
no merit. Id. at 1020, 1022.
275
Ironically, some confusion over the term comes from charges of judges
invading the Province of the Jury by excluding evidence the jury should hear. Id.
276
Id. at 1015-16.
277
Id. at 1033 n.107. See FED. R. EVID. 704(a) (“[T]estimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”).
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exclusion.”278 He also referred to it as “outmoded,” and quoted
Wigmore’s characterization of the doctrine as “‘empty
rhetoric.’”279
Furthermore, courts have begun to accept eyewitness
expert testimony regarding the accuracy of a witness’s
identification.280 State and Federal courts have found such
expert evidence “‘helpful’”281 under Rule 702 and distinguished
the evidence sufficiently from the Province of the Jury.282 The
rationale some courts were using to let in these experts could
be argued to apply equally to polygraph examiners.283
However, in Scheffer, Justice Thomas employed the
doctrine regarding polygraphs:284
By its very nature, polygraph evidence may diminish the jury’s role
in making credibility determinations.
The common form of
polygraph test measures a variety of physiological responses to a set
of questions asked by the examiner, who then interprets these
physiological correlates of anxiety and offers an opinion to the jury
about whether the witness—often, as in this case, the accused—was
deceptive in answering questions about the very matters at issue in
the trial. Unlike other expert witnesses who testify about factual
matters outside the jurors’ knowledge, such as the analysis of
fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph
expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to
its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth.285

Scholar Louise A. Jacobs argues that Thomas’s opinion
advances the Province of the Jury argument in flagrant
disregard of Daubert and thus encourages abandoning a
278

523 U.S. 303, 319 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
280
Simmons, supra note 178, at 1032-34 (one court dismissing the Province of
the Jury doctrine as “‘no more than a shibboleth’”). See Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral
Science in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 891
(2005) (“[T]he frequent exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification
despite its scientific reliability, contrasting sharply with the widespread admission of
evidence of such dubious reliability as ‘future dangerousness’ and the various
syndromes discussed above, strongly suggests that factors other than reliability are
playing the determinative role.”).
281
Simmons, supra note 178, at 1034.
282
Id.
283
Id. at 1032-34. One “court found that the testimony would ‘assist the trier
of fact’ because ‘[w]e cannot assume that the average juror would be aware of the
variables concerning identification and memory about which [the expert] was qualified
to testify.” Id. at 1033. Another wrote “although ‘personal experience and intuition’
can guide jurors in assessing witness credibility, ‘other factors bearing on eyewitness
identification may be known only to some jurors, or may be imperfectly understood by
many, or may be contrary to the intuitive beliefs of most.’” Id. at 1033-34.
284
Albeit with only minority support.
285
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (citations omitted).
279
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rigorous reliability and relevance inquiry while reviving a
facile, unpersuasive, antiquated reasoning.286 The adversary
process, she argues, as it exists today—with in limine and
Daubert hearings, as well as discovery, voir dire, and jury
instructions—is well suited to allow experts to discuss issues
that touch on a case’s ultimate issues.287
One weakness in Justice Thomas’ assertion is that
studies have shown that people are not good at determining
anothers’ truthfulness.288 Second, distinguishing in this aspect
between the evidence presented by a fingerprint analyst and a
polygraph examiner is delicate indeed. Granted, a jury could
not be expected to know whether a crime scene fingerprint bore
any similarity to that of the defendant without the testimony of
an expert. However, a jury would also be unable to know the
minute changes in the defendant’s vital signs during
questioning without the help of a polygraph examiner. While
the fingerprint specialist is testifying as to an opinion on the
fingerprint, the polygraph examiner is testifying as to an
opinion on the autonomic reaction. Moreover both fingerprint
and psycho-physiological evidence help the jury determine
facts.289
However, even if the Province of the Jury doctrine
applies to polygraphs, fMRI technology can be sufficiently
distinguished from polygraphs and should evade exclusion on
this ground. Justice Thomas seems to think that the jury is in
just as good a position to detect a lie as is a technician with a
polygraph machine. The jury can watch the defendant testify
and, with the naked eye, catch sight of quickened breathing or
a glistening brow. Perhaps the jury could see even more
outward indications of nervousness and stress that are not

286
Louise A. Jacobs, Giving Lie to Antiquated Notions of Scientific Evidence,
22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 507, 508-10 (1999) (criticizing Thomas’ argument that juries
will be distracted by debate over the technology).
287
Id. at 520-21.
288
E.g., Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1084-85 (9th Cir.
1977) (Duniway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is not unusual for
an accomplished liar to fool a jury (or, even, heaven forbid, a trial judge) into believing
him because his demeanor is so convincing. . . . Conversely, many trial lawyers, and
some trial judges, will admit that the demeanor of a perfectly honest but
unsophisticated or timid witness may be—or can be made by an astute cross-examiner
to be—such that he will be thought by the jury or the judge to be a liar.”); Aldert Vrij et
al., Detecting Lies in Young Children, Adolescents and Adults, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 1225 (2006) (finding police officers, social workers, and laypersons all detect
accuracy at a rate of approximately 60%, slightly better than chance).
289
See FED. R. EVID. 702.
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measured on a typical polygraph, such as fidgeting,290 vocal
tension, eye contact, and facial gestures. Therefore, polygraph
testimony would be unnecessary.
Because both the fMRI and the polygraph purport to
detect lies, there is a strong tendency to analogize the two
Nevertheless, in analyzing the
scientific techniques.291
Province of the Jury issue, a trial judge ought to liken fMRI
technology more closely to fingerprint or DNA evidence. While
both the polygraph and the fMRI shed light on the alleged lie,
the fMRI, like DNA, measures data far less manifest. No
matter how closely a jury pays attention, it would not be able to
determine which brain region the defendant used to answer a
question. Therefore, fMRI testimony, unlike polygraph results,
would be more clearly “outside the jurors’ knowledge.”292
IV.

WHY COURTS MAY EXCLUDE FMRI DESPITE ITS
TECHNOLOGICAL PROMISE

Despite the promise of fMRI lie detection, courts may
reject proffers to introduce the evidence, not because it fails
doctrinally, but because cultural impressions of a technology
often find their way into the Daubert analysis,293 and “mind
reading”-like devices294 carry a negative cultural suspicion.

290

Some polygraphers incorporate observable physical movements or “body
language” into the ultimate analysis. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85, at
909.
291
Judge Jed Rakoff, in his remarks to a panel, likened fMRIs to polygraphs
in that the former are “more likely to cause mischief than be a real help.” Ireland,
supra note 18.
292
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998). Michael Pardo makes
a distinction between criterial and inductive evidence, further demonstrating why the
Province of the Jury doctrine ought not to be invoked with respect to this technology.
Pardo, supra note 10, at 316-17.
293
Vickers, supra note 32, at 110.
294
The media often refers to the technology as a “mind reading” device. This
reflects both the public perception that it is such a device (when, of course, it is far
more limited) and the titillating effect such language has on consumers upon which the
media attempts to capitalize. See Jerry Adler, Mind Reading, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9,
2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5304846/site/newsweek/ (regarding
fMRI lie detection); Brain Scan ‘Sees Hidden Thoughts’: Scientists Say They Can Read
a Person’s Unconscious Thoughts Using a Simple Brain Scan, BBC NEWS, Apr. 25,
2005, available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/health/4472355.stm (bearing the sub-heading “Mind-reader” and reporting: “‘This is
the first basic step to reading somebody’s mind’ [said Researcher Dr. Geraint Rees].
‘You could use it to detect people’s prejudices’ [said Dr. Adrian Burgess of Imperial
College London].”). Cephos denies that the technology “reads minds” on a web page for
“frequently asked questions.”
Cephos Corp., Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.cephoscorp.com/fmri_deception.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
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While Daubert established a list of factors meant to analyze the
reliability and relevance of scientific evidence, studies show, in
practice, admissibility decisions are usually not based on
applications of those factors.295 Furthermore, the decision itself
significantly enhanced judicial scrutiny of “junk science,”
raising the admissibility bar for scientific evidence.296 In
addition, since Frye, lie detectors (albeit polygraph machines)
have been the very symbol of junk science.297 Finally, courts
may turn to the malleable Federal Rule of Evidence 403, or the
nearly defunct Province of the Jury doctrine298 to resist this
evidence. Therefore, even if fMRI technology could fully deliver
on its potential, hopes of being welcomed in the courtroom are
exceptionally hamstrung.
Several of the problems scholars have raised about the
Daubert decision involve the difficulty in successfully applying
the holding because it leaves judges vulnerable to improper
influences.299 First, Daubert requires judges to make decisions
regarding science that they generally are not trained to
make.300 Second, Daubert is often incorrectly interpreted to
require satisfaction of all the listed factors, such that the
technology is excluded if a piece of scientific evidence falls short
in only one or two areas.301 Third, the vast discretion permitted
under Daubert leads to “arbitrary, and unpredictable
results.”302
Judges are not scientists. The Supreme Court surely
recognized this, but asserted nevertheless that they “are
295

Studebaker, supra note 175, at 330; see also Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The
Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 368-69 (2002) (“Lower courts are
trying to determine the reliability of expert evidence mainly by a rigorous application
of the Rules.”).
296
Studebaker, supra note 175, at 330. See Groscup, supra note 295, at 36364.
297
See generally Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence, supra note 85.
298
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). See
also Simmons, supra note 178, at 1018-23 (discussing origins of Province of the Jury).
299
See Vickers, supra note 32, at 143 (“By straying from the reliability factors,
judges may be applying inappropriate criteria and rendering inconsistent judgments.”).
300
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1169-71 (2001) (citing Gary Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of
Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739
(1992)) (noting that judges were no better than jurors at “mak[ing] correct inferences
from probability data”).
301
See Vickers, supra note 32, at 120 (citing Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial
Boundary Drawing and the Need for Context-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (1996)).
302
Id. (citing Cranor, supra note 301, at 5).
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confident that federal judges possess the capacity to” assess
“whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning
or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”303
While they tend to have more education, on average, than the
typical juror, judges are surprisingly weak on some of the basic
scientific concepts required to carry out a Daubert analysis.304
In fact, one study showed that only 71% of state judges305
grasped the significance of peer review.306 Astonishingly, only
6% understood what falsifiability was, and only 4% knew what
an error rate was.307 These concepts represent three of the four
principal Daubert factors.
Granted, the Daubert list of factors is not exclusive and
judges may choose to rely on factors they more fully
understand.308 However, the Court makes clear that the
criteria it specifies in the decision represent many of the most
For
fundamental aspects of reliability and relevance.309
example, the decision refers to falsifiability as a “key
question,”310 and tends to treat it as a pre-requisite for reliable
science.311 It is difficult to grasp how a proper Daubert inquiry
can take place when 96% of state judges do not understand this
benchmark criterion.
Studies have also shown that many judges are using the
Daubert factors as “a definitive checklist or test,” despite the
opinion’s explicit instructions to the contrary.312 Approaching
the Daubert factors as a “cookbook recipe for good science”

303

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
433, 452 (2001).
305
State judges employ Daubert when their jurisdiction has adopted Daubert.
See, e.g., State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 746 (Conn. 1997) (“[W]e conclude that the
Daubert approach should govern the admissibility of scientific evidence in
Connecticut.”).
306
Gatowski, supra note 304, at 447.
307
Id. at 444, 447.
308
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 1:15.
312
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do
not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.”). See Vickers, supra note 32, at
133-34; Carl F. Cranor supra note 301, at 25 (“The Daubert opinion stressed the need
for a flexible set of criteria to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Nevertheless, it left the door open for, and perhaps even invited the use of, overly
simple, ‘cookbook’ admissibility rules.”).
304
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underestimates the sophistication of the analysis313 and
misapprehends the “flexible” inquiry the Court intended.314 A
proper analysis involves judging the particular type of
evidence, given the context, thus weighing all factors to various
extents.315 Instead, there is a tendency to “enshrine one or
more of the criteria enunciated in Daubert as determinative,
thus creating a bright-line standard with which to evaluate
proffered testimony based upon a novel scientific
methodology.”316 For example, the RAND study demonstrated
that, after Daubert, judges excluded evidence based on general
acceptance at least as frequently as they did prior to Daubert.317
In addition, judges have begun to employ factors in the
Daubert analysis that were not set down by the Supreme
Court, and to use these to exclude scientific evidence.318 A
RAND Corporation study found that since the Daubert
decision, “judges are increasingly examining the clarity and
coherence of an expert’s explanation of the theory, method, and
Arbitrary,
procedures underlying his or her findings.”319
unpredictable results surely ensue not only when judges are
meant to follow fundamental criteria that they do not
understand, but especially when they add criteria to the
analysis at will.320
Furthermore, it has been shown that the Daubert
factors are not always the reasons that judges exclude
particular pieces of evidence.321 Rather some judges rely
principally on the more ethereal requirements of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: whether scientific evidence is helpful to the
jury, whether the expert is qualified, whether substantial
prejudice may result, and whether the testimony is based on
reliable data, methods and application.322 In fact, while judges
have increasingly exercised their gate-keeping powers since
313
Cranor, supra note 301, at 25 (“Because of the complexity of scientific
issues, lower courts may shrink from the subtle but difficult task of evaluating and
weighing the various kinds of scientific evidence for the context in question.”).
314
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. See Cranor, supra note 301, at 25.
315
Cranor, supra note 301, at 25.
316
Id.
317
LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., CHANGES IN THE
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE
DAUBERT DECISION 37 (2001).
318
Id.
319
Id. (emphasis added).
320
See Vickers, supra note 32, at 143.
321
Groscup, supra note 295, at 354.
322
Id. at 354.
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Daubert, one study found surprisingly that opinions evaluating
expert evidence post-Daubert do not mention the suggested
factors any more than the pre-Daubert opinions.323
Finally, a sweeping criticism of Daubert has been that
the opinion has led to the exclusion of too much evidence.324
Empirical studies have shown that Daubert has led to a
wholesale increase in the amount of evidence withheld from
juries. The RAND Study showed that challenges based on
evidentiary reliability have increased since Daubert, as has the
percentage of such challenges that succeeded.325 A study
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center confirmed this
trend.326 As a result, critics opine that Daubert has granted too
much power to trial court judges.327
In sum, judges often do not understand Daubert factors,
exclude evidence less frequently on Daubert factors than on
non-Daubert factors, and otherwise misapply Daubert. Yet, at
the same time, they scrutinize and exclude more evidence since
Daubert was decided.
Because Daubert provides a trial judge with a great deal
of power in determining admissibility of scientific testimony,
and yet (either due to ignorance or misunderstanding) the
judge often does not analyze properly under Daubert, he or she
must evaluate on other criteria. One scholar suggests that
“judicial reluctance to rock the prosecutorial boat may partially
explain” judges’ systemic failure to correctly execute Daubert.328
A leading treatise asserts that at least one Daubert factor acts
merely “as a proxy for [judges’] confidence in the expert’s
323
Id. at 365 (“These findings suggest that judges understand the importance
of the Daubert decision, but they pay only passing attention to the suggested criteria.”).
324
Brennan, supra note 33, at 565-66 (noting excessive exclusion of evidence
in toxic torts). See also Vickers, supra note 32, at 109.
325
Dixon & Gill, supra note 318, at xv.
326
Studebaker, supra note 175, at 330.
327
Vickers, supra note 32, at 114 (citing David M. Malone & Paul J. Zwier,
Epistemology After Daubert, Kumho Tire, and the New Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
74 TEMP. L. REV. 103, 106 (2001)). Malone and Zwier state:

[T]he Court empowers the trial judge to cross the line between making a legal
determination and making a final fact determination. . . . A court can
determine that no reasonable jury could find certain facts to be true. The
judiciary has that power, but it is carefully exercised because we recognize
that incautious use of such power runs counter to the very foundations of the
jury system.
Malone & Zwier, supra, at 106.
328
Schwartz, supra note 244, at 41-42 (arguing all firearm and toolmark
identification evidence should be excluded under Daubert due to lack of scientific
foundation).
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Carl F. Cranor discusses widespread judicial
opinion.”329
misunderstanding of Daubert; recognizing the effect of
“prejudicial tendencies in both science and legal procedure.”330
This Note suggests that in the case of fMRI lie
detection, trial judges, consciously or not, may look to the
cultural perception of “mind reading”-type devices to inform the
evidentiary evaluation. A judge’s resistance to and lack of
confidence in such a science-fictional technology may inform
the decision. Several news articles announcing the successes of
this technology have, in their very headlines, described the
fMRI as virtually being able to read minds even though that
formulation far overstates the test’s ability.331 The press seems
to bank on the titillation associated with telepathy. As a
culture we are deeply divided over tests that betray the
workings of the mind because they threaten our deepest
notions of privacy as much as they promise insight.332 For
example, the fMRI has raised extensive concerns about privacy
interests in thoughts.333
Entwined with concern over its “mind reading”
implications is considerable doubt that such a device is within
the realm of possibility. While many reasonable arguments
can be leveled at the reliability of fMRI lie detection at this
early stage,334 one need only raise this issue at a water cooler or
cocktail party to see the skepticism’s unusual fervor. Perhaps
we think our minds are too opaque to ever be laid bare by a
machine, or perhaps we so desperately cling to this last frontier
of privacy that we are willing it to be impossible. In either
case, there is resistance to “mind reading” technology, even one
as primitive as the fMRI lie detector.
The polygraph has gotten a raw deal compared with
other technologies perhaps because of a cultural stigma. Some
329

1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 86, § 8:15 (the error-rate factor).
Brennan, supra note 33, at 566. (critiquing judicial application of Daubert
in toxic tort context).
331
See supra note 294.
332
“‘Little if any attention has been paid to potential misuse and the
devastating impact it would have on our civil liberties.’” Willing, supra note 11, at 5A
(quoting Barry Steinardt, director of the ACLU’s technology and liberty project).
Earlier this year, the ACLU filed a Freedom of Information Act request to government
agencies including the Pentagon, CIA, NSA, FBI and Department of Homeland
Security. ACLU, supra note 2.
333
Rosen, supra note 17, at 53. See generally Stacey A. Tovino, The
Confidentiality and Privacy Implications of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging,
33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 844 (2005).
334
Willing, supra note 11, at 5A.
330
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scholars assert “more science and more research exist
concerning polygraph examination than about most or all of the
traditional forensic sciences.”335 Nevertheless, DNA evidence
was “accepted blindly,” even though the underlying procedures
Furthermore, legal
at the time were deeply flawed.336
professionals are realizing that many of the courtroom’s most
trusted forensics fare poorly under a true Daubert analysis.337
The “all but unquestioned [technologies,] under older
admissibility tests, appear[] to have startling weaknesses when
viewed through the lens of the new test.”338 Nevertheless, in
some instances, the courts are using their discretion and
Daubert’s flexibility to hold on to particularly prized
techniques.339 For example, despite mounting evidence that
latent fingerprint analyses is simply not reliable, courts are
“manipulating the law” to continue admitting such evidence.340
Such observations invite speculation that something beyond
the pure, legal analysis is at play.
Jennifer Mnookin argues in the context of fingerprinting
that an age-old, yet faulty, notion about the reliability of a
forensic field may cause a court to overlook Daubert’s
methodical inquiry.341 At the very least, “[d]islodging such a
prior belief will require, at a minimum, a great deal of
evidence, more than the quantity needed to generate doubt
about a technique in which people have less faith.”342 Likewise,
perhaps a field such as lie detection, so plagued with concern
and skepticism, may require enormously high accuracy rates
and an extensive track record, beyond what a court would ask
of a less stigmatized field. Perhaps the higher standard
demanded of lie detection has less to do with the Province of
the Jury or the stigma of the polygraph, and more to do with
the stubborn dislike of mind reading. In other words, just as
judges find that Daubert is satisfied for deeply entrenched
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technologies, despite little, actual scientific support, it may be
dissatisfied with novel and innovative technologies, despite
what appears to be a high measure of reliability.
Michael Pardo encourages courts to learn from history,
likening the fMRI to the once-frightening photograph.343
“Photography, it was thought, potentially could usurp the
power of courts to determine facts by shifting power to
photography experts, and away from courts, to determine the
true nature of reality. None of this happened, of course,
because the evidence was eventually assimilated.”344 Factfinders have come to learn in which circumstances photographs
might be helpful and in which they might not.345 Pardo
suggests that the same evolution is likely with fMRIs.346 He
puts forward the following scenario: “there may be an initial
divergence in the willingness of courts to admit the evidence,
but (perceived) reliable use for limited purposes in some initial
cases may lead to an increased willingness of other courts to
exercise their discretion and admit it.”347
Pardo underestimates, however, the implications of
early failures at trial. If the first set of attempts to admit fMRI
lie detection tests fail, it is likely that courts hearing
subsequent requests will follow the precedents rather than
defend a new, complicated, and controversial technology.348
Early rejections might not only stall, but doom the technology’s
admissibility for years to come. One need only look at Frye to
see the devastating effect an early rejection could have on the
science’s fate in the courtroom, even though the 1923 opinion
left the door open for subsequent advances in polygraphy.349
Furthermore, early failures might dry up the private funding
financing the research and development for companies such as
Cephos and No Lie MRI.350
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Pardo also underestimates the cultural stigma
associated with this type of technology. The polygraph is a
closer analogy to fMRI lie detection than the photograph
because the polygraph, like the fMRI, looks beyond what the
eye can see and into the machinations of the brain. In fact, the
fMRI technology goes even further into these troublesome
areas than the polygraph.
Any uneasiness toward the
polygraph is likely to be triggered in the fMRI debate as well.
Therefore the polygraph’s troubled fate is a more appropriate
predictor for what the fMRI must combat in the years to come.
There are several worrisome consequences to
unjustifiably excluding fMRI evidence. First, helpful and
reasonably accurate evidence regarding truth telling will not
get to the jury. The scope of this concern includes any trial
that revolves around the fact-finder believing the person
testifying. Given the average juror’s mediocre ability to
distinguish the truth from a lie,351 this is likely a significant
cost.
Another problem that will result from over-exclusion of
fMRI evidence, given a culturally influenced Daubert analysis,
is its effect on a race to the courthouse. Even presuming it is
aware of the court’s predisposition, a company such as No Lie
MRI cannot reasonably anticipate the extent of the obstacles to
admissibility. Attempting too early to admit fMRI evidence
may fail and further exacerbate the technology’s chances of
future admittance. Attempting too late deprives courts of the
best evidence available in the meantime. Furthermore, the
inability to anticipate the court’s response to a new technology
disincentivizes commercial developers who may be in the best
position to develop and package the technology for courts.
Therefore, while this cultural effect is conceptually
understandable, it poses a significant obstacle to the
introduction of the best new forms of scientific evidence.
The final problem is the resulting evidentiary law’s
opacity. Judges have found so many various reasons to exclude
lie detection, that it will be difficult to prepare a new
technology for trial.352 Federal courts have excluded polygraphs
for reasons including validity concerns, fear of overvaluing the
evidence, Province of the Jury doctrine, and “the possibility
that the trial will degenerate into a time-consuming trial of the
351
352
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technique.”353 (In at least one case, the judge thought that the
specific examination questions were too broad and excluded the
The decisions, moreover, have
evidence as irrelevant.354)
resulted not just in doctrinal inconsistencies throughout the
country,355 but in paradoxes,356 unusually shifting standards,357
and hazy Daubert analyses.358
Laken, the CEO of Cephos, opined that his company had
been working hard to pass the Daubert analysis: testing,
publishing, and improving accuracy.359 That may not be
enough. Assuming that fMRI litigation will draw comparisons
from the polygraph, how can Cephos, or No Lie MRI, be
confident entering this fray? Even though the two companies
will go to great pains to distinguish themselves from any legal
precedent of the polygraph, a cultural distrust of lie detectors
may well cause them trouble.
Therefore, the typically loose Daubert analysis will
likely endanger technologies like the fMRI, because cultural
prejudice against new and contentious disciplines can easily,
even innocently, color the evidentiary decision. The result:
helpful and reliable evidence is excluded, the technology’s
developers are disincentivized, and the precedents are hard to
interpret.
V.

CONCLUSION

The companies vying to win market share in fMRI liedetection technology have a treacherous road ahead. While
Daubert gave a glimmer of hope to the fMRI’s crude cousin, the
353
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polygraph, it remains generally excluded. The fMRI should
fare far better under a proper Daubert analysis. Reasonable
objections, however, could be raised regarding accuracy and
general acceptance considering the technology’s youth.
Moreover, a substantial number of trial courts exclude
scientific evidence for reasons not set down in Daubert.360 If
judges, in making their evidentiary decisions, were to allow
themselves to be influenced by the skeptical cultural ethos
towards “mind reading” technologies, they will exclude it.
Alternatively, a court may determine that fMRI results satisfy
Daubert, but then immediately turn to either the Province of
the Jury Doctrine or Rule 403 to keep this perplexing
technology at bay.
While Daubert permits a court to weigh the relevant
scientific community’s opinion of “mind reading” evidence, it
gives no such weight to the public’s opinion at large. A frank
discussion of society’s fears and suspicions of these technologies
is necessary.
Policy makers should understand that when it comes to
issues as controversial as these, judges’ evidentiary decisions
may be permeated by societal doubts and cultural attitudes.
Trial courts are not immune from such deeply held beliefs and
will find countless ways, under the available doctrines, to allow
them to sway an evidentiary decision. Any lawyer seeking
admissibility for these techniques would be well-advised to
specifically address such powerful suspicions. To rely only on
what is specifically demanded by the relevant doctrines is a
mistake.
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